At Assamaka, a remote outpost at the edge of the Sahara, Algeria and Niger have officially activated their trans-Saharan fiber optic link. Beyond the hundreds of kilometers of cable and the promise of faster internet lies a far larger question: can this strategic infrastructure survive the very instability it is meant to overcome? The project opens a new digital corridor, reduces Niger’s reliance on existing routes, and strengthens Algeria’s ambitions to become a regional connectivity hub. Yet in a Niger still menaced by jihadist groups, safeguarding the cable may prove as challenging as building it.
Assamaka: a symbolic launch and a deeper strategic bet
The location was never arbitrary. On October 6, 2026, telecommunications ministers from Algeria and Niger presided over the official commissioning ceremony at Assamaka, in the Agadez region, right on the border between the two countries. The event marked a key milestone in the Trans-Saharan Fiber Optic Backbone (DTS), a regional project within the NEPAD framework designed to eventually link Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania.
Untangling the finances: what the 43 million euros really represent
Contrary to what the phrase “Algeria-Niger deal” might suggest, public documents do not show a single bilateral contract in which Niamey pays Algiers tens or hundreds of millions of euros. The financing is far more layered.
According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Nigerien component of the backbone amounts to about 43 million euros. This envelope covers 1,031 kilometers of fiber optic cable across five main routes, a Tier III national data center, and an 88-kilometer local loop.
Figures from Nigerien authorities go further. In March 2026, the project coordinator reported total funding exceeding 30 billion CFA francs, including roughly 16 billion CFA francs in credit, 12.76 billion in grants, and 2.17 billion in national counterpart funding.
It is crucial to avoid a common confusion: the 43 million euros correspond to Niger’s own component, not a sum paid by Niger to Algeria to purchase the link. AfDB documentation for the multinational project approved in 2016 shows a financial architecture blending the African Development Fund, European co-financing, and state contributions. The original multinational project was valued at 62.262 million units of account.
In short, no public document supports the claim that Algeria “earns” X billion and Niger Y billion from the inauguration. That is precisely where the economic investigation begins.
What does Niger actually gain?
The primary beneficiary is undeniably Niger. As a landlocked country, it depends on international connections routed through neighboring states. The new backbone offers an additional path to the global internet, notably via Algeria.
The benefit is not just the cable itself but access to international capacity. Algeria holds significant bandwidth thanks to its submarine cables, and for years Algerian authorities have stated their intention to use that capacity to connect landlocked Sahelian nations.
For Niamey, this potentially means:
- more internet capacity;
- better quality of service;
- reduced dependence on certain existing routes;
- greater competition among capacity providers;
- new possibilities for digital public services;
- growth in e-commerce and mobile financial services;
- improved connectivity for northern regions.
The project is also meant to connect Niger more closely not only to Algeria but also to Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Chad. The economic promise is considerable. Yet the exact savings for the Nigerien state or the additional annual revenue it will collect has not been published at this stage.
And what does Algeria stand to win?
This is where the file turns geopolitical. Algeria has not merely built infrastructure that stops at its border. For years it has sought to make its territory a digital gateway to the Sahel.
Algiers says it has already completed about 2,548 kilometers of fiber optic cable between Algiers and In Guezzam on the Nigerien border. In 2024, the Algerian ministry even cited around 2,600 kilometers completed.
The logic is straightforward: route Sahelian digital traffic toward Algerian international infrastructure. For Algeria, this potentially opens a data transit market. The more Niger—and tomorrow other Sahelian countries—uses Algerian international capacity, the stronger Algiers’ position as a regional digital hub becomes.
There is already a concrete sign of this strategy. In September 2026, Algérie Télécom signed an agreement with Niger Télécom providing for a donation of transmission equipment to enable a link between In Guezzam and Agadez, with an initial announced capacity of 100 gigabits.
This is telling: Algiers is no longer content with building its share of the backbone. It also seeks to support the operation and reinforcement of Niger’s infrastructure. The desired return is not necessarily an immediate financial one. It can be commercial, technological, diplomatic, and strategic.
Algeria’s bet: becoming the digital gateway to the Sahel
Algiers’ calculus goes far beyond telecommunications. The Algerian government officially presents the Trans-Saharan Backbone as a way to make Algeria a regional connectivity hub and offers landlocked Sahelian countries access to its international capacities linked to submarine cables.
This strategy comes amid Algeria’s repositioning in the Sahel. In March 2026, Algiers and Niamey reaffirmed the strategic nature of their partnership, giving particular priority to security coordination and infrastructure projects linking the two countries: the trans-Saharan road, the fiber optic cable, and the trans-Saharan gas pipeline.
The cable is therefore one piece of a much larger puzzle. For Algiers, strengthening economic and digital ties with Niamey helps consolidate its influence in a region where other powers—Russia, Turkey, Gulf states, China, and Western actors—are also vying for presence. Fiber thus becomes an instrument of soft power, but also of economic sovereignty.
The paradox: strategic infrastructure in a high-risk zone
One question that official ceremonies tend to downplay: who will protect the fiber?
The route crosses parts of Niger where security risks are far from theoretical. The Agadez region is a strategic space for Niger. Assamaka, on the Algerian border, sees a reinforced military presence. In March 2026, the commander of defense zone No. 2 traveled there to meet forces deployed in this strategic area.
Recent history also reminds us of this border’s vulnerability: in June 2021, a joint police and national guard patrol was attacked near Assamaka, leaving four dead.
But the problem extends well beyond the country’s north. In 2026, Niger faces growing pressure from two major jihadist organizations: the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISSP) and JNIM, affiliated with Al-Qaeda. ACLED has described western Niger as a major confrontation theater between the two groups.
In June 2026, an attack claimed by JNIM on Niamey’s airport and military base further demonstrated armed groups’ ability to strike sensitive infrastructure, even in the capital.
The risk to the fiber is twofold: sabotage and accidental or deliberate network disruption, but also the difficulty of maintaining infrastructure that crosses long desert distances.
Fiber as a sovereignty infrastructure
This is probably one of the most underestimated issues. The backbone does not only carry streaming, messaging, or social media. It can support administrative communications, financial services, trade exchanges, data systems, and digitized public services.
Niger plans to accompany the fiber with a Tier III national data center designed to strengthen its digital sovereignty. The more the country digitizes its administration and economy, the more critical this infrastructure becomes.
That means it will need to be protected like a road, an oil pipeline, or a power line. Paradoxically, this necessity gives a new dimension to security cooperation between Algiers and Niamey. In February 2026, the two countries decided to strengthen border control and coordinate their strategies against terrorism and cross-border crime.
A new route, but not yet a revenue stream
The big economic question remains open. How much will Algeria earn each year from Nigerien traffic? How much will Niger save on connectivity costs? What will be the transit price per gigabit over the Algerian link? What share will go to public operators?
For now, available public data do not allow precise answers. What can be established, however, is much more solid: Niger benefited from an investment of about 43 million euros for its national component, largely financed by the AfDB and supplemented by a national contribution; Algeria has built several thousand kilometers of fiber on its own territory; and the two countries have now turned these two national networks into an operational cross-border digital corridor.
The real “deal,” then, is less a check than an architecture. For Niamey, it is a partial escape from digital isolation. For Algiers, it is the chance to become a privileged digital gateway to the Sahel.
But in a space where armed groups still contest state territorial control, one final condition will determine the success of this ambition: that the cable remains intact. For in the Sahara, building fiber is a technical feat. Turning it into profitable, secure, and sustainable infrastructure may be the true challenge of the next decade.
