Why the Orano divorce leaves Niger at a crossroads
Since the July 2023 coup, Niger has dramatically broken away from Orano, the French company that mined its uranium for over half a century. Niamey nationalized the Somaïr, revoked the Imouraren permit, moved closer to Russia, attracted Chinese and Iranian interest, and then welcomed new Western investors. The goal is clear: regain control over a strategic resource. But one question lingers: is Niger selling its uranium on better terms today than during the Orano era? The available evidence suggests a mixed answer. Niamey’s bargaining power is undeniably stronger, yet no public data proves the country consistently secures a higher price. More troubling, several confidential negotiations have been reported, though no clandestine contract has been irrefutably established to date.
Orano exit: sovereignty gained, but a weakened industry
The split between Niamey and Orano is not just diplomatic. It is industrial and financial.
Orano lost operational control of its Nigerien activities in December 2024, before the Somaïr, the historic operator of the Arlit mine, was nationalized on June 19, 2025. The French group, which held 63.4% of Somaïr against 36.6% for the Nigerien state, contests the nationalization and has initiated multiple international arbitration proceedings.
The problem for Niamey is that taking back control of a mine does not automatically mean having a market.
Niger’s production has fallen sharply over the past decade: from 4,116 tonnes in 2015 to just 962 tonnes in 2024, according to data reported in 2026. Niger now has only one operating mine, while several projects remain undeveloped.
In other words, mining sovereignty has advanced faster than the country’s industrial and commercial capacity.
The uranium price: beware of the false case against Orano
A widespread idea is to compare the supposed “French price” with the current world price. That comparison is misleading.
Uranium does not work like oil: there is no single stock market giving a daily price at which all producers sell. Contracts are negotiated directly between producers, intermediaries, and nuclear utilities, with formulas that can incorporate spot and long-term indices.
Historical data nevertheless provide an interesting benchmark.
In 2020, available figures indicated that Niger received about 48.1 billion CFA francs for 1,113 tonnes from Cominak and 103.3 billion CFA francs for 1,879 tonnes from Somaïr. For Somaïr, that worked out to roughly €83.75 per kilogram of uranium, based on calculations from public data at the time.
Another analysis based on ITIE data estimated that uranium bought from Orano in recent years was around 45,000 CFA francs per kilogram, or about $33 per pound, while some European or Japanese buyers reportedly paid around 60,000 CFA francs/kg.
The market has changed considerably since then.
In 2025, the average spot price paid by European utilities was $70.33 per pound, up from $53.59 in 2024. The average price of multi-year contracts, however, was much lower, at $54.70 per pound.
By late September 2026, the spot indicator stood around $89.63/lb, while the long-term price reached about $96.50/lb.
The conclusion is important: Niger today enjoys a far more favorable price environment than in the early 2020s. But that does not prove Niamey is actually selling its uranium at $90 or $100 per pound.
This is where the file becomes opaque.
The mysterious $170 million Russian contract
The most spectacular case concerns the yellowcake stockpile accumulated at Arlit.
In 2025, several French sources claimed that Niamey had struck a deal with Russia for 1,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate for about $170 million. If confirmed, that would equate to roughly $170 per kilogram, or nearly $77 per pound.
That price would be below the spot price of late September 2026, but comparable to some contractual levels seen on the international market.
The problem is that the agreement has never been officially confirmed by both parties. The Nigerien government denied selling the stock, and Rosatom stated it was not party to the alleged deal.
Yet the affair is not merely a rumor without material elements.
In November 2025, about 1,000 tonnes of yellowcake were indeed loaded onto trucks at Arlit. Some thirty vehicles then reached Niamey under military escort. The convoy ultimately became stranded at the capital’s airport.
This is precisely where the gray zone begins.
A physical transfer of such magnitude does not, by itself, constitute proof of a sale. But it demonstrates that Nigerien authorities were actively working to commercialize the stock.
The $170 million figure must therefore be presented as an allegation documented by several sources, not as an established contract.
What about Iran? Confidential talks that left traces
The Russian file is not the first opaque episode.
In 2024, Le Monde revealed confidential negotiations between Niamey and Tehran over 300 tonnes of yellowcake, valued at around $56 million. Several Western and Nigerien sources confirmed the existence of discussions.
The Nigerien government denied concluding a sale. However, an adviser to the authorities acknowledged that Iran had wanted to buy the 300 tonnes, explaining that Niamey refused due to lack of available stock.
Again, three notions must be distinguished: negotiation, agreement, and executed contract.
The available information establishes the existence of negotiations. It does not prove that a clandestine delivery took place.
Russia and China: new allies or new customers?
Russia is now Niamey’s most visible geopolitical partner in the nuclear sector.
In December 2025, the Nigerien company Timersoi National Uranium Company signed a cooperation agreement with Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Russia’s Rosatom, to explore deposits and eventually develop new mines.
China, too, has shown interest in the Arlit stocks. In 2025, sources reported discussions potentially involving around 1,000 tonnes.
But these new partners do not necessarily guarantee better prices.
They primarily offer Niger more negotiating options.
That is a fundamental difference.
Is Niger really selling its uranium better today?
At this stage, the most honest answer is: not yet demonstrated.
Niger now has three advantages it did not possess with the same intensity before.
First, the international uranium price is much higher.
Second, Niamey is seeking to diversify its partners: Russia, China, but also Canadian, Australian, and American players.
Third, the government now directly controls an essential part of the mining chain.
But three weaknesses limit this strategy: falling production, logistical problems, and legal uncertainty linked to the dispute with Orano.
In September 2025, an ICSID arbitral tribunal also ordered Niger not to sell or transfer to third parties the uranium produced by Somaïr that is subject to the litigation.
Political sovereignty alone is not enough to create a solvent market.
The Nigerien paradox
Niger now wants to sell its uranium “at the best price.” But to achieve that, it must be able to produce regularly, transport its ore safely, attract capital, and legally guarantee its contracts.
The country is precisely trying to rebuild that capacity. In 2026, it even created the Teloua Safeguarding Uranium Mining Company, intended to replace the nationalized Somaïr. Meanwhile, new Western investors are returning: in September 2026, the United States approved up to $414 million in financing for Global Atomic’s Dasa project, led by a Canadian company.
That may be the real turning point.
Niger is not simply replacing France with Russia. It is gradually trying to turn its uranium into a lever for competition among several powers.
For now, however, no public evidence supports the claim that new contracts bring Niger more than those signed under Orano. International price levels are higher, yes. Negotiating possibilities are more numerous, yes. But the contracts actually signed, their price formulas, premiums, logistical costs, and the net share returning to the state remain largely opaque.
As for “occult contracts,” there are confidential negotiations and sufficiently serious accusations to justify investigations, particularly around Iran and Russia. But speaking of definitively established secret contracts would, to date, go beyond the available evidence.
The real challenge for Niamey is therefore no longer just knowing whom to sell its uranium to. It is knowing at what price, with what guarantees, and above all what share of that value will actually remain in Niger.
