After three years of relentless conflict, the war in Sudan has now spilled across the border into Chad. Cross-border strikes, military tensions, and communal unrest are creating a volatile situation in N’Djamena and beyond.

border clashes intensify as Sudan war rages

Since April 2023, Sudan has been embroiled in a brutal civil war between the army of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti. Despite Chad’s public stance of neutrality, the government has quietly backed the RSF. This hidden alliance has sparked significant controversy, especially given that the RSF has targeted Zaghawa communities in Darfur—many of whom hold key positions in Chad’s state apparatus. Weapons deliveries, reportedly funded by the United Arab Emirates, have reportedly passed through towns like Amdjarass and Adré, a risky move with consequences now unfolding.

tine: the epicenter of cross-border tensions

There are two towns named Tiné—one in Sudan and one in Chad. These twin settlements are home to the same Zaghawa populations and serve as a critical crossing point for civilians fleeing the horrors of Darfur’s war. On February 21, 2026, the RSF seized control of the Sudanese side. This prompted immediate clashes with the Toroboros—Chadian and Sudanese fighters allied with General al-Burhan—and even Chadian troops acting outside official orders. The fighting led to a swift reoccupation of the town. In response, N’Djamena announced the closure of the border, yet clashes persisted, underscoring the deepening entrenchment of the conflict in this transborder zone.

Against this explosive backdrop, a deadly drone strike struck Tiné (Chad) on March 21, killing nearly two dozen civilians. Chadian authorities deny involvement, yet accusations fly. Opposition figure Ousmane Dillo, currently exiled in Sudan, released an audio message widely circulated on private messaging platforms, directly accusing Mahamat Déby of orchestrating the attack and calling for his removal. He also warned of the dangers posed to the Zaghawa community. On the Sudanese side, Darfur governor Minni Arkou Minawi escalated tensions by declaring that ‘the war with Chad has already begun.’

Chad ramps up military readiness

Chadian authorities remain defiant. Government spokesperson Gassim Chérif Mahamat reaffirmed the country’s neutrality while vowing a ‘proportionate response’ to any attacks. President Mahamat Déby ordered a maximum military alert. On March 22, a high-level security summit was held in Tiné, gathering top military officials to bolster border protection and prevent national destabilization. ‘This is Tiné, Chad—not Tiné, Sudan. Let the Sudanese army, the Toroboros, and the RSF fight it out in their own country. They must not bring their war here to attack our people,’ declared General Ali Ahmat Akhabach, Minister of Security.

Following the summit, N’Djamena banned civilians from crossing the border, effectively preventing women and children fleeing Sudan’s war from reaching refugee camps in Chad. While framed as a security measure to curb potential Zaghawa rebellions, experts argue this decision does little to improve security. Cameron Hudson, a Sudan conflict analyst, cautioned: ‘Chad’s military buildup at the Sudanese border amid rising tensions risks dragging Chad directly into the Sudanese conflict rather than keeping it out. Déby’s attempt to project strength may be a strategic misstep.’

communal tensions fuel cross-border militancy

The conflict is not only pulling Zaghawa communities into Sudan’s war. According to Chadian security sources, the RSF has been recruiting young men from the Tama ethnic group over recent weeks. This mobilization resembles mercenary activity, facilitated by local networks involving traditional leaders, administrative authorities, and figures close to the regime.

Like the Zaghawa, the Tama are a transborder community, present in both eastern Chad (Wadi Fira, Ouaddaï) and western Sudan. Despite not being Arab, during the initial Darfur conflict (2003), they were integrated into Janjaweed militias—the predecessors of the RSF—and fought against ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa. This resurgence of old alliances is deeply concerning, reigniting divisions within Chadian society and deepening mutual distrust between communities.

In this climate, the Chad-Sudan border is no longer a mere line on a map—it has become a battleground for the spillover of war. What once appeared as a calculated gamble now risks spiraling into an uncontrollable crisis. Chad’s leadership, once walking a tightrope, now finds itself trapped in a dangerous spiral. The genie is out of the bottle—and it may be too late to put it back.