Burkina Faso’s political transition: navigating the post-compaoré era

The interpretation of a coup d’état frequently shifts, influenced by the geopolitical interests of the international community and endorsed by neighboring states. In this context, the “designation” of Transitional President Michel Kafando was deemed unconstitutional. Consequently, Burkina Faso is operating, for at least twelve months, with institutions that were established ad hoc.


Much like an intricate Lego construction, the transitional institutions are gradually taking shape. Since the sudden appearance of military uniforms on the public stage, following the hasty departure of the “Sphinx of Kosyam,” Ouagadougou has seemingly found a measure of calm.

Emerging from relative obscurity, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida quickly dominated the political landscape, assuming all the prerogatives of a Head of State. His true intentions remained ambiguous. How did he manage to integrate himself among the protesters and political party leaders? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, perhaps, a pre-arranged strategy between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré to maintain control over power? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning himself with the people naturally sparked suspicion and mistrust. The military’s initial actions and pronouncements, such as the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly, immediately raised fears of a nascent junta. It appeared that the populace, having sacrificed and shed blood for their victory, was on the verge of being dispossessed.

True to form, the African Union promptly threatened to isolate Burkina Faso. Simultaneously, a delegation of ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – arrived to engage with the military leadership, urging them to reconsider their stance. The precedents set by Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabè officers to think twice: firstly, that seizing power by force is no longer tolerated without repercussions; and secondly, that a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the nation and incurring widespread unpopularity.

Ultimately, the army negotiated a compromise solution, formalized within the Charter of the Transition. The agreement stipulated that the transitional presidency would be held by a civilian, while the military would retain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT), was established to accommodate key figures who spearheaded the popular uprising. A Designation Committee, comprising about twenty members, was tasked with the crucial responsibility of naming a Transitional President. This was conceived as a fixed-term contract, extending until November 2015, coinciding with the original end date of President Blaise Compaoré’s mandate.

For the selection of the Head of State, each vital component of the Nation’s forces – the military, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five personalities were retained for consideration:

The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, who edits the weekly newspaper l’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publication director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ consistent criticism of the former regime. The military, in contrast, presented a more diverse array of candidates: Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso, a diplomat named Michel Kafando, and Joséphine Ouédraogo, a former minister. Early in the process, Archbishop Ouédraogo, an initial frontrunner, declared he was not interested in the role, preferring to focus on his current ecclesiastical duties.

The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage due to their extensive experience in prominent international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his country at the UN headquarters in New York, first from 1981 to 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the land of the Upright Man, an invisible divide often separated society into those for or against Sankara. This implicit cleavage has historically influenced every political figure’s trajectory. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity between 1984 and 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Thomas Sankara’s government, under President Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements over the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held diametrically opposed ideological views.

A career within an international institution provides a dual benefit: it enhances one’s curriculum vitae and expands one’s network of contacts. This was a notable disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists presented by the opposition.

For a limited period, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, was compelled to set aside his cattle and chicken farming in Saponé for a noble cause: safeguarding the nation in peril. He assumed the dual responsibilities of Transitional President and Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual mandate proved convenient for diplomatic channels, offering a single point of contact and effectively circumventing the head of government, Isaac Zida.

The unfolding situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored from various capitals: Accra, which currently chairs ECOWAS; Addis Ababa, home to the African Union; and Paris and Washington, due to their geopolitical interests. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (representing the AU), Ghana (representing ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, a gesture aimed at rehabilitating Burkina Faso’s international standing. Did this significant representation implicitly endorse the re-establishment of a Constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States typically adheres to a principle of non-cooperation with heads of state not elected through universal suffrage, a situation currently applicable to Burkina Faso. Therefore, the international community orchestrated a strategy to legitimize the coup and reinstate a semblance of constitutional order. This ensured that American reconnaissance aircraft could remain stationed in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as vital footholds for monitoring the Sahel region.

Out of 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four key portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Minister of Security in 2011, was assigned the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, took charge of Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed duties at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was appointed Keeper of the Seals – a form of consolation prize – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned a few days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized the former prosecutor for having “shelved” the Norbert Zongo case.

The National Transitional Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, as its president. He secured 71 out of 90 votes from his peers. The next crucial step involves completing the institutional framework and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including the establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), a new electoral code, and relevant organic laws.


What are the objectives for this brief transitional period?

Since early December, Michel Kafando has signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate are key questions. More than 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the nation of the Upright Man is finally seeking a process of catharsis. Immediately following his appointment, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a role, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would request Morocco to “extradite” former President Blaise Compaoré.

Through a series of public declarations, the current leaders have opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases typically demand a considerable amount of time, likely extending beyond the transitional period. Were these statements made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s priority. In this regard, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct hierarchical superior – was dismissed from his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.

Will Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma remain loyal to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso successfully defused the political crisis of October 30, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with minimal major incidents. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial clashes could have easily triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to concentrate on holding elections rather than potentially implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by re-opening the Sankara file?

How can a “witch hunt” be avoided? Two general managers of major national companies, perceived as close to the ousted president’s family, have already been dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from the Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from the Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition doesn’t entirely absolve past transgressions, it contributes to reconciliation; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid tribute to the seven individuals who fell victim to gunfire during the events of October 30 and 31, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery.

Will the CRNR endure beyond the conclusion of the transitional period? With all institutions now in place, political actors and parties are poised to take center stage. No prominent political figure chose to occupy a seat within either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively disqualifies them from running in universal suffrage elections. Presidential candidates are now in the starting blocks. The creation of the CNT provided an opportunity for the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to dissolve itself. The electoral battle is expected to commence in early 2015.