Since Captain Ibrahim Traoré assumed power, official communications have steadily promoted a narrative: that Burkina Faso has regained control over its destiny, curtailed external dependence, and opted to self-finance its war against armed groups.
This message carries political weight. Rearmament is portrayed as the tangible expression of sovereignty. Military acquisitions are highlighted, the Patriotic Support Fund is presented as a national endeavour, and appeals for citizen contributions serve to demonstrate that the country relies primarily on its own resources.
Yet a far less ideological question persists: what does this sovereignty truly cost, and who bears the burden?
The surge in defence spending
Budgetary figures already reveal a shift in scale.
Defence and security allocations, which hovered around 95 billion CFA francs in 2016, have climbed to several hundred billion CFA francs, surpassing 800 billion in 2024 depending on the budgetary scope considered.
The increase is considerable.
It reflects a clear political priority: in a nation grappling with a major security crisis, the state now devotes a far larger share of its resources to the army, security forces, equipment, and the war effort.
However, such a dramatic rise cannot be viewed solely through a military lens. Every additional billion allocated to security is also a billion that must be sourced from somewhere.
It is precisely here that the sovereignty discourse warrants scrutiny against financial mechanisms.
The patriotic fund does not cover everything
The Patriotic Support Fund stands as one of the key symbols of this strategy.
Contributions have reached substantial sums since its inception: nearly 99 billion CFA francs in its first year, approximately 175 billion in 2024, and over 200 billion according to figures released for 2025.
It would therefore be unfair to dismiss the scale of national mobilisation.
But another misconception must be avoided: the Patriotic Fund alone does not represent the entirety of war financing.
The state budget remains the primary framework for funding public policies. Military expenditures are thus also sustained by tax revenues, ordinary state resources, and—when revenues fall short—by borrowing.
In other words, contributing voluntarily to the war effort does not mean the war is financed without debt.
Debt takes on a new form
This is where the debate becomes more compelling.
Burkina Faso’s public debt has risen sharply since 2021. It now exceeds 8,000 billion CFA francs based on available data and projections for recent years.
A significant portion of this debt is now raised on the WAEMU regional market, notably through the issuance of public securities.
This allows Burkina Faso to diversify its funding sources and reduce certain dependencies on external creditors.
But debt contracted on the regional market remains debt.
Whether held by a bank, an institutional investor, or another regional financial actor, its economic nature is unchanged: the state borrows today and must repay tomorrow, with interest.
This is where the sovereignty narrative reaches its limits.
One can fully defend the choice to prioritise domestic financing. One can also consider borrowing from the regional market preferable to certain forms of external dependence.
But presenting this mechanism as the disappearance of financial dependence would be misleading.
The real question: where does public money go?
The issue is not whether Burkina Faso has the right to rearm. It obviously does.
The issue is determining the cost of this rearmament for public finances as a whole.
When a growing share of resources is directed toward security, the government must arbitrate among competing priorities: defence, education, health, infrastructure, agriculture, social protection, and debt repayment.
These trade-offs are rarely visible in political discourse.
Yet they constitute the true test of economic sovereignty.
A state can purchase more weapons while remaining financially vulnerable. It can reduce certain foreign military cooperations while increasing its reliance on borrowing. It can mobilise patriotic contributions while devoting a growing portion of future revenues to debt repayment.
Diplomatic rupture therefore does not automatically mean financial rupture.
The mechanical effect of debt
A less dramatic but far more enduring risk also exists: debt servicing.
Every loan contracted today creates an obligation for years to come. When interest rates are high and investment needs remain substantial, the government must allocate more resources to meeting repayments.
It is a simple mechanism: the more the state borrows, the more it must set aside tomorrow from its revenues to pay creditors.
The problem is not necessarily indebtedness itself. All modern states borrow.
The question is rather whether debt-financed expenditures generate sufficient economic and social returns to enable the country to bear the future burden.
For military spending, the equation is even more delicate: military equipment may be essential for national security, but it does not necessarily generate revenues to repay the loan that financed it.
Military sovereignty, economic dependence?
This is the contradiction that the Burkinabè model reveals.
The authorities claim strategic autonomy: new partners, diversified alliances, national mobilisation, and reduced traditional cooperations.
Yet simultaneously, the economy continues to operate with conventional public financing instruments: taxation, domestic debt, the regional market, multilateral creditors, and economic cooperation.
This is not an exceptional contradiction. It is the normal functioning of a state facing limited resources and considerable security needs.
The difficulty arises when political communication transforms this financial reality into a narrative of absolute self-sufficiency.
Beware of spectacular figures
Certain claims circulating on social media also require clarification.
Speaking of military indebtedness amounting to “hundreds of billions of dollars” is incompatible with the scale of Burkina Faso’s economy.
The country’s GDP falls within a range of a few tens of billions of dollars, not hundreds of billions. A military debt of several hundred billion dollars would far exceed the nation’s economic capacity.
The reality is already significant enough that it need not be exaggerated.
It is hundreds of billions of CFA francs at stake, not hundreds of billions of dollars.
This distinction is essential for any serious analysis.
The true paradox of “sovereignty on credit”
Burkina Faso can therefore legitimately assert political and military sovereignty while remaining an indebted state.
But this reality compels a more demanding question: how far can war financing go without weakening the state’s other functions?
Sovereignty is not measured solely by the number of armoured vehicles, drones, or weapons acquired.
It is also measured by the capacity to pay civil servants, invest in education and health, fund infrastructure, support the productive economy, and above all, repay loans contracted on behalf of the community.
The real challenge is not to deny the efforts made by Burkinabè authorities. It is to look beyond the narrative.
Who pays? How much? With what resources? And for how long?
If a significant portion of rearmament relies on public revenues, national contributions, and debt, then the proclaimed sovereignty is not a sovereignty without cost.
It is a sovereignty financed by taxpayers, savers, financial markets, and future generations.
And it is precisely for this reason that the phrase “sovereignty on credit” deserves to be posed as a question, rather than a slogan.
For political independence can be proclaimed in a few speeches.
Financial independence, however, is verified in the accounts.
