On April 20, 2026, General Évariste Ndayishimiye embarked on an official “friendship and working” visit to Ouagadougou. At the time, the Burundian head of state held the rotating chairmanship of the African Union (AU).
This diplomatic overture aimed to rekindle dialogue between the continental body and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This alliance, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is currently under the leadership of Captain Ibrahim Traoré.
The initiative unfolded amid the withdrawal of AES member states from AU institutions. During his visit to Burkina Faso, a nation led by a military coup regime, the Burundian president commended efforts to restore security and stabilize the country, where the leader has publicly stated that democracy is no longer relevant. Yet, beneath the diplomatic rhetoric of “dialogue” and “stability,” one might discern a form of solidarity among authoritarian regimes, united by a common rejection of constitutional constraints.
Analysis reveals the political strategies employed by countries like Mali and Burundi to navigate external pressures, particularly international sanctions from bodies such as the European Union and regional organizations.
A convergence of trajectories
Indeed, a clear convergence of institutional trajectories links Burundi with the states of the AES. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU) following military coups in 2020 and 2021 in Mali, 2022 in Burkina Faso, and 2023 in Niger.
Burundi itself was sanctioned by the EU and the United States in 2016 after President Pierre Nkurunziza sought a third term, widely deemed unconstitutional. Certain political phenomena necessitate a transregional comparative approach, not merely to identify superficial similarities, but to highlight profound, convergent underlying logics.
The rapprochement between Burundi and Mali, for instance – two nations separated by thousands of kilometers and operating in distinct geopolitical environments – exemplifies this analytical framework.
The designation of an enemy
In both cases, the identification of an enemy, whether internal or external, serves as a pivotal mechanism for legitimacy and a potent driver of internal cohesion. This strategy allows for the constant reactivation of a perceived threat based on political circumstances, be it a colonial adversary, a regional rival, or a diffuse security menace.
In Mali, this mechanism intensified notably in early 2022. Fueled by a “rally around the flag” effect – a phenomenon where the populace unites behind leaders in the face of an external or perceived threat – the Malian authorities saw their power solidify.
Supported by a civilian component in the second iteration of the transition following the May 2021 putsch, the military leaders garnered massive popular backing.
On January 14, 2022, tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on Boulevard de l’Indépendance to denounce economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS. They vocally expressed hostility towards Paris and the regional organization, accusing them of interfering in the nation’s affairs. They also asserted a demand for a Mali solely for its citizens, free from external influences.
In Burundi, it is Belgium that crystallizes the anger of supporters of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), the ruling party. Accused of historically fostering ethnic divisions within the country, the former colonial power is also implicated in alleged complicity with Rwanda in attempts to destabilize the incumbent regime.
The Burundian government, led by the CNDD-FDD, portrays Brussels as the instigator of economic sanctions imposed by the EU – a narrative that enables both regimes to deflect international criticism by framing it as resistance against the former colonizer.
Choosing a regional adversary
Regionally, each regime also selects a particular adversary. In Mali, Algeria stands accused of hosting opposition figures like Imam Mahmoud Dicko and of complicity with active terrorist groups in the country. The Malian junta announced on January 25, 2024, the “immediate termination” of the Algiers peace agreement.
Mali also closed its airspace to Algeria, following a similar measure taken by the latter in April 2025. In Burundi, however, it is Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, a Tutsi-led regime, that occupies this role.
Labeled a “bad neighbor” by President Ndayishimiye, Kigali faces accusations of having harbored coup plotters involved in the 2015 attempted coup. Rwandan authorities are also presented by Burundian officials as supporters of rebel movements such as RED-Tabara, sometimes linked to other armed groups in the region.
This defensive stance led to the closure of land borders with Rwanda in January 2024, as well as active military intervention in eastern DRC between August 2022 and December 2025. This intervention aimed to support the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), alongside Wazalendo militias (patriots in Kiswahili) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), against the M23 Movement, which is backed by Kigali.
These symbolic resources are mobilized to cultivate a perpetual sense of siege – a necessary condition for the political survival of regimes that have transformed external threats into their primary fuel.
The security paradox
Nevertheless, a security contradiction exists between the two nations. In Mali, the threat appears more immediate through attacks perpetrated by the FLA and JNIM on April 25, 2026. These assaults contribute to bolstering the credibility of the regime’s security discourse.
This divergence in the nature of the threat leads to distinct legitimization strategies.
The head of Mali’s junta, Assimi Goïta, has effectively freed himself from electoral constraints. In July 2025, the National Transitional Council granted him a renewable five-year mandate without elections and without term limits, finalizing a drift that began with earlier postponements of the ballot promised for March 2024.
The junta no longer needs to legitimize a vote; instead, it positions itself as the sole bulwark capable of defeating JNIM and FLA – even as the Malian economy, though resilient, remains vulnerable to recurrent electricity cuts and the gradual withdrawal of development and humanitarian aid.
In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD has designated the incumbent president as its candidate for the 2027 presidential election, and the ballot, even if controlled, remains a mandatory step.
The security record highlighted by Gitega therefore does not replace an election; rather, it aims to prepare for it, in a context where security concerns can relegate an economic performance marked by fuel and currency shortages, affecting the country since 2015, to the background.
Considering both nations among the world’s poorest – with Burundi ranking last in 2023 – does the constant externalization of responsibility through the perpetual construction of an enemy also mask, as per French political scientist Jean-François Bayart’s analytical framework, internal predatory dynamics that structure authoritarian regimes?
Ultimately, the comparison between Mali and Burundi reveals less about the singularity of each trajectory and more about the robustness of a common logic among regimes that have transformed their enemies not into a burden, but into their very foundation.
