With Cameroon’s 2027 dual elections on the horizon, economist Serge Alain Godong delivers a blunt assessment of the nation’s political landscape.
Analyzing the Cameroonian political scene through the lens of game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma, Godong argues that Maurice Kamto’s 2018 defeat was not a fluke—and that his chances in 2027 remain slim. In a thorough breakdown, he characterizes the current regime as overtly twilight and suggests that voters gravitate toward the devil they know rather than the uncertainty of change.
« The overtly twilight nature of the four-decade-old regime now shapes the dynamics of either consolidation or transformation within Cameroon’s public sphere, » writes Godong, an economist with degrees from Sciences-Po Paris, EHESS, and Paris X. His analysis begins with 2018: « The shock had faded from the public eye after Mr. Kamto’s public declaration of scoring a ‘penalty’—a claim that drew widespread skepticism. Since then, Paul Biya has been sworn in for another term, the MRC has been sidelined, and most Cameroonians have accepted the quiet continuation of power at the Etoudi Palace. »
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Godong’s argument hinges on two core assumptions: « Humans are fundamentally calculative » and « they require information to secure their gains. » An election, he posits, is a unique moment when an individual proposes a social contract for the nation’s future.
Yet Kamto, in Godong’s view, cannot offer a more compelling contract than the one currently in place. « The nearly 8.5 million Cameroonian voters who will head to the polls next year would only cast their ballots for Maurice Kamto if they could be certain he would better safeguard their interests in the years ahead than Paul Biya. »
The economist identifies roughly 16 million « winners »—civil servants, formal private-sector employees, freelance professionals, and their families. « We can estimate that these individuals and their households share an annual collective income of 1,500 billion CFA francs, » he notes. This group benefits from public-sector salaries, government contracts, and major infrastructure projects. « These Cameroonians—and their networks—will almost certainly vote for the RDPC and its candidate, fully aware of their choice. »
This sets the stage for the prisoner’s dilemma: without coordinated information or verifiable proof of a superior alternative, voters default to the status quo. « Cameroonians recognize that the current situation is far from ideal, yet many prefer it to an uncertain equilibrium they cannot substantiate. »
The analysis then pivots to what Godong terms the « Bamiléké problem. » Citing Meredith Terretta, he distinguishes between gung (territory) and lepue (freedom), framing a social and economic Darwinism among the Grassfields’ communities. The consequence? « Kamto is not seen as a standard political alternative but as a malevolent figure bent on executing a sinister agenda. »
The author introduces a concept akin to—but distinct from—the Stockholm syndrome: a « eat-together » system where « everyone is tied to everyone else through petty corruption, each taking from the next. » A model where « winners are those who ‘eat,’ and losers are those who go hungry. »
Godong concludes that whoever emerges victorious « will have no choice but to act swiftly and decisively. » Swiftly to redistribute wealth. Decisively to prioritize the economy as the sole « flagship initiative. » Growth targets of 6%, deficit reduction, and anti-corruption measures: « These are urgent and serious priorities. »
In the end, the analyst predicts a political landscape that grows « less complacent and less extractive, » insisting that Cameroon needs « a strong, engaged Paul Biya to navigate the post-transition phase. »
