There is something absurd about this picture. Public health facilities running out of rapid HIV tests for over a year, patients sent home without screening, while Moroccan manufacturers have kits ready to deliver within days of an order. The shortage, reported by several health professionals and patients, is not merely a logistical issue. It reflects a deeper malfunction in public procurement within the health sector, where national preference—though enshrined in law—remains a dead letter.
Moroccan law is explicit. Decree No. 2.22.431, which governs public procurement, includes a national preference mechanism. It stipulates that the technical specifications of a tender must be defined on the basis of performance and function, not by reference to a specific brand, origin, or patent. According to Abdelhay Rhorba, a professor at Hassan II University of Casablanca and researcher in administrative law of public procurement, violating this principle is legally actionable.
“Inserting excessively precise technical conditions or demanding certifications held only by a specific competitor violates the principle of equal opportunity,” he explains, “and can constitute an abuse of power.” Moroccan administrative courts, he notes, assess such situations based on a simple criterion: unjustified exclusionary effect. In other words, if a tender specification, even formally correct, ends up excluding local producers, it can be challenged.
Recourse exists: a friendly appeal to the National Commission for Public Procurement before the contract is awarded, followed by a complaint to administrative courts within sixty days. In cases of suspected corruption, Moroccan criminal law provisions on influence peddling can also be invoked.
But one must have the means to fight an administration.
On the ground, the reality described by sector actors is blunt. The special specification documents (CPS), technical documents defining tender requirements, are reportedly drafted based on foreign products already in use, perpetuating old contracts without considering new national production capabilities.
A Moroccan medical device manufacturer, speaking on condition of anonymity, describes a Kafkaesque situation. His laboratory sells products in several African countries but holds less than 2% of the Moroccan public market in its segment. “CPS should be based on Moroccan products, which is not being done today,” he says.
When a sector actor requests clarification from the contracting authority to indicate that a tender is tilted toward a foreign product, the response is often silence or inaction. The public tender remains unchanged.
And the contradiction does not stop at the Ministry of Health’s doorstep. It goes up to the heart of the government itself. While the Ministry of Finance recently raised customs duties on certain imported medical devices to encourage national production, the Ministry of Health continues, according to sector sources, to buy more expensive imported products, ignoring available local equivalents at competitive prices.
The Directorate for the Supply of Medicines and Health Products of the Ministry of Health provides its reading of the situation. It states it acts “in strict compliance with the applicable regulatory framework” and specifies that tenders are “open to all operators meeting the required conditions, with particular attention to operators established in Morocco.” However, a nuance: the ministry clarifies that this requirement concerns the location of companies, not the origin of product manufacturing. In other words, an importer based in Morocco is treated equally to a Moroccan manufacturer.
The HIV test case is particularly telling. According to information gathered, a stock-out lasted more than a year in some facilities. The ministry confirms in its written response that “temporary tensions have indeed been observed in certain health structures,” attributing them to “delays related to public procurement procedures and disruptions affecting international supply chains.” Tenders are currently underway to secure supply, and “complementary alternatives” are being studied.
This explanation leaves several sector observers skeptical. If local producers have available stocks and approved products, why did shortages last several months without them being urgently approached?
On the question of direct contracting, the ministry is formal: “No recourse to direct contracting procedures has been made in this context.” The 2025 acquisition procedures would have been conducted “exclusively through tenders, in strict compliance with current regulations.” This statement directly contradicts information reported by multiple sources close to the matter. Without public official documents, it is not possible to settle this point.
Direct contracting is legal only under limited conditions: extreme unforeseen urgency, justified technical exclusivity, or failure of a tender. Decree No. 2.22.431 requires written justification and proof of lack of alternative, recalls Abdelhay Rhorba. “Otherwise, recourse to this procedure is considered illegal.”
Health sovereignty: a distant ideal
Behind the public procurement question lies the issue of Morocco’s health sovereignty. Professor Jaafar Heikel, a renowned infectious disease specialist, provides an important nuance: the absence of rapid tests does not mean total inability to diagnose. Public and private laboratories can, in most cases, perform standard biological analyses. But the value of rapid tests lies elsewhere: in their accessibility, speed, and ability to reach populations that do not visit conventional facilities.
“NGOs like OPALS or ALCS play an extremely important role in HIV screening in Morocco,” he emphasizes. “They need these tests to reach people who might not go to a laboratory.” Interrupting their supply therefore has consequences for the field response.
On national production, Professor Heikel is clear: “When these locally manufactured tests are validated by state structures, it is very interesting for the country, first for financial reasons, and because it moves toward health sovereignty.”
2030 at risk?
Morocco has adopted the UNAIDS 95-95-95 targets: 95% of people living with HIV should know their status, 95% of diagnosed people should be on treatment, and 95% of treated people should have an undetectable viral load. These targets aim to end AIDS as a public health threat by 2030. These ambitions rely precisely on widespread, rapid, and accessible screening.
“When there is no test, fewer individuals are screened and the disease has more chance to spread,” sums up a manufacturer. Professor Heikel shares this view: “We will achieve the 95-95-95 targets more quickly if we have rapid tests and validated national production.”
The Ministry of Health says it remains “fully mobilized to ensure the continuity of screening services.” A mobilization that sector actors are waiting to see translated into action and into the special specification documents.
Today, sources are no longer hesitant to voice their questions aloud: are some members of the compliance and validation committees for tenders acting to protect their own interests, or those of established foreign suppliers, in disregard of ministerial directives?
An investor who develops a validated product, responds to a market, and is systematically excluded will not do so forever. The risk is simple: discouraging investment in national production at the very moment Morocco needs it most. And continuing to buy abroad what the country is capable of manufacturing itself.
