Morocco’s 2024 census exposes electoral map flaws ahead of 2026 vote
The rapid urbanization revealed by Morocco’s 2024 population census is reshaping the country’s electoral landscape, raising critical questions about fair representation in the 2026 parliamentary elections.
The 2024 General Population and Housing Census (RGPH 2024) has uncovered dramatic shifts in Morocco’s demographic landscape. Over the past decade, rapid urban expansion, the hollowing out of historic city centers, and relative stagnation in rural areas have fundamentally altered how people are distributed across the country.
These changes are forcing a critical examination of Morocco’s electoral map ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections. The question looms large: does the current electoral system still ensure equitable representation? A detailed analysis of census data alongside the existing electoral map reveals significant disparities in representation between different constituencies nationwide.
Extreme disparities in voter-to-representative ratios
The electoral map analysis, which measures the number of eligible voters per parliamentary seat, exposes stark contrasts. Morocco’s electoral system operates on two key principles:
- Demographic logic: allocating seats based on population size.
- Territorial equity: guaranteeing a minimum of two seats per province to prevent marginalization of less densely populated or remote regions.
The latter requirement creates significant representation gaps. In sparsely populated southern provinces, the ratio of eligible voters per seat is remarkably low:
- Aousserd: 2,992 eligible voters per seat.
- Tarfaya: 5,368 eligible voters per seat.
- Assa-Zag: 10,178 eligible voters per seat.
- Es-Semara: 19,712 eligible voters per seat.
- Boujdour: 20,185 eligible voters per seat.
At the other extreme, major urban centers and their surrounding peripheries face dramatically higher ratios:
- Tanger-Assilah: 213,980 eligible voters per seat.
- Ménara (Marrakech): 176,256 eligible voters per seat.
- Sidi Bernoussi (Casablanca): 174,501 eligible voters per seat.
- Nouaceur (Casablanca periphery): 155,172 eligible voters per seat.
- Inezgane-Aït Melloul: 151,978 eligible voters per seat.
A single vote in provinces like Aousserd or Tarfaya thus carries far greater proportional weight in electing a representative than one cast in major urban centers like Tangier or Marrakech.
Urban-rural divide and the rise of urban peripheries
RGPH 2024 data confirms Morocco’s accelerated urbanization trend. With a total population of 36,828,330, urban residents now number 23,110,108—an increase of nearly 2.68 million over the past decade. Meanwhile, the rural population stands at 13,718,222, having grown by only 302,419 in the same period. Notably, 71.2% of Morocco’s population is concentrated in just five regions: Grand Casablanca-Settat, Rabat-Salé-Kénitra, Marrakech-Safi, Fès-Meknès, and Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma.
Geographer David Goeury highlights a striking trend: population shifts from historic city centers to peripheral municipalities. Casablanca-Anfa’s population plummeted by nearly a quarter over the past decade, from 453,000 to 332,000 residents. Yet it retains four parliamentary seats, yielding a ratio of 68,707 eligible voters per seat.
Contrast this with Nouaceur, a rapidly growing peripheral province near Casablanca. Its population doubled in the same period to reach 665,000 residents. With only three seats, its ratio stands at 155,172 eligible voters per seat.
If unchanged, this pattern will deepen representation imbalances within metropolitan areas. Similar disparities emerge in Rabat: while the city’s Rabat-Océan and Rabat-Chellah constituencies have ratios of 55,856 and 59,598 eligible voters per seat, respectively, the expanding periphery of Skhirat-Témara records 141,832 eligible voters per seat.
Political stakes of potential electoral boundary adjustments
Adjusting the electoral map to align with 2024 census realities requires complex, strategic political decisions ahead of the 2026 elections. If the Interior Ministry opts to rebalance seats without increasing the total number of deputies in the House of Representatives, it would need to reallocate seats from declining urban centers like Anfa or parts of Rabat to growing peripheries like Nouaceur or Skhirat-Témara.
Reducing the number of seats in a constituency intensifies electoral competition. Fewer seats available naturally advantages larger parties with greater financial resources and established mobilization networks—such as the current coalition partners RNI, PAM, and Istiqlal. Conversely, a higher number of seats per constituency lowers the threshold for smaller parties to gain parliamentary representation through the “largest remainder” mechanism.
Rural anchoring and voting behavior distortions
Despite growing urbanization, many city-dwelling voters remain registered and vote in their rural hometowns to maintain local influence networks. This explains persistently high participation rates in rural areas, sometimes exceeding 90% of registered voters. Meanwhile, urban turnout in middle-class constituencies often falls below 30% to 20%.
This transitional context frames the ongoing voter registration and list revision campaigns. Beyond enrolling new voters, these efforts aim to update records for citizens who have moved—particularly from urban centers to fast-growing peripheries—correct errors, and enhance the electoral roll’s reliability ahead of the September 23, 2026 parliamentary elections.
Challenges and opportunities for the 2026 elections
The census data introduces strategic challenges for the upcoming vote. Geographer David Goeury’s analysis highlights two key dynamics:
- Re-engaging the urban middle class: squeezed by inflation and feeling excluded from targeted social assistance reforms, middle-class urban voters largely abstained in 2021. Their potential return in 2026—whether as a protest vote or support for alternative platforms—could reshape political balances.
- Political positioning: the ruling coalition’s major parties must defend their economic and social track record in a post-inflation context, while opposition groups like the PJD seek to capitalize on urban discontent and mobilize a base disappointed by past local governance.
Ultimately, reconciling demographic realities revealed by RGPH 2024 with the preservation of territorial balances will demand precision from policymakers. Though no official electoral boundary revisions have been announced yet, the new population figures have set the stage for an unavoidable technical and political debate ahead of the 2026 elections.
