Emmanuel Macron has chosen a confrontational tone to describe the state of relations between France and the military regimes of the Sahel. By asserting that Paris was “repaid with ingratitude,” the French head of state unequivocally acknowledged, in language rarely so direct, the conclusion of a diplomatic era that began over a decade ago. This declaration unmistakably targets the juntas currently governing in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, three capitals that have successively informed France of the termination of bilateral military cooperation.
A presidential statement seals the sahelian rupture
The language used by the occupant of the Élysée Palace sharply contrasts with the usual diplomatic caution often employed when addressing African partners. By emphasizing France’s significant efforts, which came at a considerable cost in human lives and financial resources, Emmanuel Macron aims to attribute responsibility for the diplomatic breakdown to the transitional authorities that emerged from the coups d’état of 2020, 2022, and 2023. His remarks also cater to a domestic audience in France, where the Sahelian sequence is widely perceived as a major strategic setback following the forced withdrawal of Operation Barkhane in 2022.
Nevertheless, the presidential phrasing risks further exacerbating an already precarious situation. In both Bamako and Niamey, the official narrative has been built upon denouncing a French presence deemed intrusive, even neo-colonial. Each statement from the Élysée expressing grievances invariably fuels the sovereignist rhetoric championed by Colonels Assimi Goïta, Ibrahim Traoré, and Abdourahamane Tiani. European chancelleries, closely observing these developments, fear that such direct language could also complicate their own remaining channels of communication with the Sahelian capitals.
The alliance of Sahel states and France’s receding influence
Since the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023, which evolved into a confederation in July 2024, the three military regimes have dramatically accelerated their diplomatic reorientation. Their moves include withdrawing from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), fostering closer ties with Moscow through Africa Corps, the successor to Wagner, and opening dialogues with Ankara and Tehran. This geopolitical repositioning by Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey is proceeding at an accelerated pace. France, which once maintained significant economic influence through entities like the CFA franc, Orange, TotalEnergies, and Eramet, is now seeing its leverage diminish.
In practical terms, the announced departure of the last French troops from Chad and Sénégal by the end of 2024 marks the completion of Paris’s military disengagement from the Sahelo-Saharan region. The French presence in West Africa, which still comprised over 5,000 personnel in 2020, has now been reduced to a residual footprint, primarily focused on training and intelligence. This contraction profoundly transforms the French influence model, which had long relied on the projection of force.
Paris’s double-edged rhetoric
By publicly invoking the “ingratitude” of African partners, Emmanuel Macron risks reinforcing a postcolonial interpretation that has already resonated widely with Sahelian public opinion, particularly among urban and youth segments. Whether intended or not, the term evokes a paternalistic grammar that the French executive had ostensibly sought to dismantle since the Ouagadougou discourse of November 2017. The stark contrast between initial promises of renewing the Franco-African relationship and the current reality of rupture is now undeniable.
Furthermore, the presidential statement comes at a time when Paris is actively seeking to rebuild its African partnerships around states deemed more stable, ranging from Morocco to Côte d’Ivoire, including Bénin and Mauritanie. This strategy of bypassing the Sahel requires a measured public discourse, lest it contaminate the entire spectrum of its relationships. Several African diplomats, even in allied nations, privately express discomfort with what they perceive as an overly personal register.
In Dakar, Abidjan, and Nouakchott, these developments are being closely observed, as they illustrate France’s difficulty in cleanly concluding a chapter without reopening old wounds. The question persists: how can Paris restore its credibility as an attentive partner on the continent while grappling with a Sahelian outcome it considers unjustly received?
