Escalating conflict: boko haram and iswap vie for sambisa forest control

The 60,000 square kilometer Sambisa Forest in Northeast Nigeria, once a vibrant natural reserve popular with tourists, has undergone a stark transformation. Its abundant wildlife has largely vanished, replaced by a brutal struggle between two militant groups and the soldiers relentlessly pursuing them.

Since 2016, when Boko Haram fractured into two distinct factions, the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), these groups have been locked in a fierce contest for dominance over the forest. Recent intelligence indicates a significant escalation in these internal clashes.

Sambisa’s vast expanse and dense, canopied vegetation make it an exceptionally strategic location. It offers ideal hideouts for militants and serves as a critical base for launching attacks and controlling vital trafficking routes across the region.

According to Malik Samuel, a senior researcher at Good Governance Africa, the conflict for JAS initially represented a fight for survival. Despite their internal rivalry, both factions have demonstrated remarkable resilience, maintaining their operational capacity against state forces, including the Nigerian army and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

Security analyst Zagazola Makama, based in Borno, has documented numerous engagements within and around the Sambisa Forest. Both warring parties frequently assert having inflicted substantial casualties on their opponents.

While these claims often remain unverified, they underscore the intense rivalry that now defines the relationship between the two groups. This internal conflict has developed in parallel with their broader insurgency against state forces.

Since Boko Haram initiated its insurgency in 2009, the violence has tragically spilled into neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. United Nations data reveals that this protracted conflict has resulted in over 40,000 civilian deaths and displaced more than 2 million people.

The JAS faction is primarily known for its tactics of abduction, widespread looting, and deadly assaults. In contrast, ISWAP has focused on establishing territorial control, levying taxes, and attempting to set up an alternative local governance structure, all while exhibiting a vicious disregard for human life. Both Sambisa Forest and the islands of Lake Chad have long served as critical strategic strongholds for these rival factions.

  1. Makama observes that despite sustained counter-terrorism pressure, insurgents continue to maintain active communication networks and operational capabilities within these enclaves. The ongoing clashes between Boko Haram (JAS) and ISWAP are increasingly viewed as both a formidable challenge, due to the unpredictability they introduce, and a potential opportunity, as they could ultimately weaken the overall cohesion of insurgent forces across the region.

Research by Taiwo Adebayo, a Boko Haram specialist at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, suggests that the Nigerian and multinational forces’ intense focus on countering ISWAP’s campaigns against military installations has inadvertently provided the JAS faction with the necessary space and time to regroup.

In an analysis from 2025, Adebayo emphasized the need to rebalance security strategies. He argued that JAS should be treated as an independent and adaptive threat, rather than merely a weakened rival of ISWAP.

Malik Samuel anticipates a prolonged stalemate in the conflict between these two rival militant groups.

He explains the difficulty for ISWAP to penetrate the JAS stronghold at Barwa, where its leader is situated, which complicates any operation aimed at eliminating the JAS leadership, similar to past Sambisa campaigns. Furthermore, the close proximity of both groups within the Lake Chad islands makes direct confrontation unavoidable as they fiercely compete for territory and vital resources.

Outside of these island territories, however, JAS is generally outmatched by ISWAP, which possesses greater numbers, broader territorial reach, more extensive operational coverage, superior experience, and the presence of foreign terrorist fighters.