France and Morocco chart a new course with friendship treaty

France and Morocco are signaling a strong mutual desire to forge a comprehensive agreement rooted in enduring strategic interests. This initiative aims to establish, with necessary adaptations, an equivalent to the historic Franco-German Élysée Treaty, signed in 1963 by General de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

A dedicated commission has been tasked not with negotiating the treaty itself—a responsibility reserved for the two governments—but with formulating concrete proposals. These will encompass the guiding principles of the partnership, strategic priorities extending to 2035-2040, mechanisms for political dialogue, and key areas for economic, security, military, academic, and cultural cooperation.

A fundamental question arises: why a friendship treaty? This new accord is set to supersede the La Celle-Saint-Cloud agreement, signed in France on November 6, 1955. That foundational agreement paved the way for Morocco’s return to independence and the official end of the protectorate on March 2, 1956, notably authorizing the return of Mohammed V to the Throne after his deportation on August 20, 1953.

Today, the objective is clearly to solidify the achievements of an already privileged, even exceptional, cooperation, while simultaneously laying strategic foundations for an equal partnership designed to thrive for decades to come.

Four primary pillars underpin this ambitious endeavor. The first centers on economic collaboration: Paris commits to substantial investments in key Moroccan industrial sectors such as automotive, railway, defense, and maritime transport. Furthermore, France will support the modernization of these industries through advanced technologies. Rabat, in turn, pledges preferential access for French enterprises within major infrastructure projects and offers attractive fiscal incentives.

This friendship treaty would uniquely bind France to a non-European Union state, a notable achievement considering Algeria has pursued a similar agreement for over two decades without success, despite multiple attempts under presidents Jacques Chirac, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Emmanuel Macron, and Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

The second pillar addresses security and defense industry cooperation. This involves the transfer of military technologies, ultimately positioning Morocco as a regional hub for the production of light and heavy equipment, including aviation components, munitions, military vehicles, and armored systems. Joint training and exercise programs will also be expanded, alongside enhanced coordination in security and intelligence to tackle regional security challenges, particularly in the Sahel.

Culture forms a crucial third pillar. It emphasizes maintaining the privileged status of the French language within the Moroccan educational system and promoting Francophonie, without impeding the Kingdom’s embrace of international business languages like English. The treaty also aims to facilitate Moroccan students’ access to French universities—currently exceeding 42,000—and expand the existing network of twelve French cultural institutes, including the establishment of new schools, particularly in the Southern Provinces.

The final pillar encompasses geopolitics and strategy. This involves Paris’s unwavering support for Morocco’s supreme interests, including backing the autonomy plan for the Sahara, which has been validated by the Security Council within the framework of the negotiated settlement process (Resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025). France will also advocate for Moroccan interests within European Union institutions and defend them in sectors such as agriculture and fishing, as well as across various bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks.

Additionally, France anticipates Morocco’s participation, through various modalities, in new strategic alliances across West Africa, a region where French influence has gradually diminished over the past decade. The goal is to leverage the Kingdom’s strategic position as a regional hub.

Ultimately, this proposed treaty carries immense symbolic and diplomatic weight. It would establish a unique bond between France and a non-European Union nation, a distinction particularly noteworthy given Algeria’s protracted and unsuccessful efforts to finalize a similar agreement over more than two decades, despite numerous attempts spanning several presidencies.

Morocco has firmly established itself as a regional power, an economic hub, and a leading player in energy, logistics, and security matters. This treaty, therefore, could serve as a demonstrative and exemplary model: a blueprint capable of rearticulating new forms of cooperation between Europe and Africa.