The synchronized assaults by the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) on April 25, 2026, signify a profound strategic shift since 2012. By striking Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré simultaneously, these groups exposed the inherent weaknesses of a security framework heavily reliant on external support. The recapture of Kidal severely undermines the Malian junta’s narrative of legitimacy and reveals the limitations of its Russian partnership in confronting jihadist forces. While a direct military takeover of Bamako appears unlikely in the short term, JNIM continues its war of attrition. The escalating regional contagion risk places increasing pressure across the Sahel and on coastal states within the Gulf of Guinea.
The growing pressure on Bamako
The coordinated offensive by JNIM and FLA on April 25, 2026, marks a significant escalation in Mali’s security landscape. The simultaneous and unexpected assaults on Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré reflect a continuous deterioration observed since 2020, exacerbated by the junta’s rise to power in August of that year.
Initially confined to Mali’s northern rural areas, JNIM has steadily enhanced its capability to launch attacks further afield, demonstrating increased intensity and coordination. In recent years, its operations have expanded westward and southward, reaching regions previously relatively untouched. The group’s influence now extends beyond Malian borders, impacting coastal nations such as Togo, Bénin, and Nigeria. Concurrently, the number of attacks attributed to JNIM has surged, particularly those targeting the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). In July 2024, FAMA, supported by the Russian Africa Corps, suffered a notable defeat against a coalition of JNIM and CSD-DPA. Since then, JNIM has conducted a series of attacks on military bases in Tombouctou (north), Bamako (south), and Kayes (west). Meanwhile, FAMA has also bolstered its capabilities, notably with Turkish-supplied Bayraktar drones, though these are insufficient for comprehensive territorial surveillance.
Since September 2025, JNIM has implemented an economic strangulation strategy against Bamako, a capital city of approximately 3.2 million inhabitants. This involves disrupting logistical routes and targeting fuel convoys, aiming to gradually erode the government’s legitimacy. By directly impacting citizens’ living conditions, particularly through rising fuel prices and associated economic disruptions, JNIM seeks to weaken the junta’s credibility while positioning itself as an alternative. As the junta’s authority diminishes in rural areas and Bamako, JNIM increasingly appears as a credible alternative and a viable governance option to the populace. The blockade of the capital effectively stages the state’s impotence. JNIM endeavors to improve its image not by seizing the capital by force, but by demonstrating the existence of an alternative form of authority. In areas under its control, the group has established a parallel administrative structure based on Islamic justice, taxation, and trade regulation, enabling it to present a concrete alternative to an absent state.
A military capture of the capital remains improbable for now, given JNIM’s estimated strength of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters against a city where most security forces and infrastructure are concentrated. JNIM also lacks sufficient popular support, especially in urban centers. However, isolated attacks against Modibo Keita International Airport, which hosts Africa Corps elements, could become more frequent. Conversely, rural areas, characterized by minimal state presence, provide a fertile ground for the group’s entrenchment. Furthermore, the Bamako blockade suggests that military capture of the capital is not a short-term objective; the strategy relies on a predominantly psychological war of attrition. Nevertheless, the increasing pressure on Bamako forces the Malian Armed Forces to concentrate their responses there, thereby easing their grip on other parts of the territory.
Kidal’s recapture and narrative erosion
The April 25 attacks underscore this surge in power. In Kati, the heart of Malian military authority, Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed. In Bamako, Modibo Keita Airport was struck. In Kidal, JNIM and FLA regained control of the city, which FAMA and Wagner had recaptured in 2023 in what was then hailed as a historic victory. This strategic reversal is unprecedented since 2013, compelling Africa Corps elements to withdraw from both Kidal and Gao. The pressing question now is whether FAMA can retake the city in the coming weeks.
This recapture of Kidal by JNIM echoes the dynamics of 2012 when Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups initially collaborated before ideological differences caused a split. JNIM advocates for the establishment of Sharia law, while Tuareg rebels pursue an autonomist agenda centered on Azawad. Kidal then symbolized this division, contested by both factions. These divergences persist today, but the identification of common adversaries—the junta and its Russian partner—has fostered an opportunistic tactical convergence. Signs of rapprochement were already circulating in March 2025. According to jihadist movement expert Wassim Nasr, negotiations to combine efforts reportedly took place as early as December 2024. The durability of this opportunistic coalition and its ability to maintain control of Kidal remain uncertain.
These attacks occurred despite an alleged truce that should have been signed in late March 2026 between JNIM and the Malian government, reportedly involving the release of several jihadists in exchange for lifting the fuel blockade on Bamako. Mali subsequently denied releasing 200 jihadists. The veracity of this agreement remains questionable. Regardless of its existence, it clearly failed to halt JNIM’s offensive momentum.
On April 28, JNIM announced the commencement of a “total siege” targeting Bamako and demanded the definitive withdrawal of Russian forces from Malian territory. The following day, its spokesperson, Mohamed Ramadane, declared that the regime would fall and that the group intended to “liberate” Gao, Tombouctou, and Ménaka. Such maximalist rhetoric suggests little inclination for immediate negotiation.
The blow to the junta is both political and military. The killing of the Defense Minister is no minor event. Crucially, Africa Corps’ withdrawal from Kidal undermines the narrative upon which the regime had built its legitimacy since 2021: the promise of restored sovereignty through a Russian partnership presented as structurally superior to the French presence. Wagner, and subsequently Africa Corps, were mobilized in the junta’s official discourse as the adequate solution to the country’s insecurity and the stabilization of power. Kidal falls again, and with it, the Russian security narrative fractures.
While Africa Corps may have faltered against rebels and jihadists, it has successfully protected the regime and Assimi Goïta, fulfilling part of its mandate. This setback weakens their standing without signaling their complete demise in Mali or neighboring countries.
External support under scrutiny
However, it is important not to overstate JNIM’s immediate ambitions. The group may not necessarily benefit from the immediate collapse of the regime. A weakened but still-standing junta serves as a useful adversary, bolstering JNIM’s own legitimacy among the population. Conversely, a political vacuum could facilitate the return of international actors whom the group seeks to exclude, and a direct confrontation with Russia could prove particularly costly, as Russian forces retain superiority and potentially greater troop numbers. While Russian forces may lack the air superiority that French forces possessed during Operation Barkhane, Vladimir Poutine could, if he chooses, dispatch reinforcements to salvage the situation.
In any event, a Russian disengagement does not appear imminent. Moscow swiftly reaffirmed its support for Bamako, and the Russian ambassador was received by Assimi Goïta in the days following the attacks. On Africa Corps’ Telegram channels, an aggressive communication campaign quickly unfolded, attempting to regain control of a narrative that was slipping away by showcasing numerous combat images. Withdrawing from Mali, a showcase for the Russian security model in Africa through Wagner and then Africa Corps, would be an admission of defeat for Russia. The Kremlin will therefore seek to preserve its credibility, even if it means intensifying its commitment.
It is also worth noting that Russia is not the sole external supporter of the junta. Turkey, through the SADAT company, has reportedly been present in Mali since 2024, engaged in a dual mission of protecting the junta and training special forces. This arrangement likely played a role in securing the junta leader during the April 25 attacks. As the situation deteriorates, Ankara may be called upon to play an increasing role in protecting the regime. In a communiqué issued on May 1, FLA spokesperson Mohamed Ramadane called on Turkey to “re-evaluate the nature of their commitment alongside the ruling junta in Bamako, in order to play a positive role in Mali.”
A reconfigured Sahel region
The Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) has maintained a discreet stance. While a communiqué was issued on April 27 condemning the attacks, neither Niger nor Burkina Faso intervened militarily. Yet, the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which established the alliance in September 2023, includes a mutual assistance clause in the event of an attack on the sovereignty and integrity of its members. Article 6 explicitly states:
“Any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more Contracting Parties shall be considered an aggression against the other Parties and shall entail a duty of assistance and relief from all Parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force, to restore and ensure security within the area covered by the Alliance.”
Furthermore, during the Chiefs of Staff meeting on April 16 and 17, 2026, the three nations had announced their intention to increase their unified force to 15,000 soldiers, up from its original 5,000. Confronted with the same jihadist threat on their own territories, Niger and Burkina Faso evidently deemed it imprudent to disperse their forces.
Further north, the situation could benefit Algeria. On one hand, the shift of the attacks’ center of gravity towards central and southern Mali moves the threat’s epicenter away from Algeria’s historical borders. On the other hand, Algiers has been pursuing a strategy of Sahelian re-engagement for several months. This is evidenced by President Tiani’s state visit to Niger in February 2026, the trans-Saharan gas pipeline project crossing Niger, and the announcement of a 50 billion CFA franc program to modernize Burkina Faso’s infrastructure. Algiers considers its influence in the Sahel a natural extension of its sphere of influence. Its historical rival, Morocco, is advancing its own initiatives with the Atlantic Initiative, launched in 2023, which aims to offer landlocked Sahelian countries access to the Atlantic Ocean via Mauritania. The destabilization of the Malian junta provides Algiers an opportunity to regain the initiative, even if relations between the two capitals remain strained, particularly due to Bamako’s alignment with Moroccan positions regarding Western Sahara.
The current configuration offers Algiers the advantage of a privileged negotiation channel with the FLA, with whom it has historical ties. The 2015 Algiers Accord, now largely obsolete but retaining symbolic value, was negotiated under its auspices. While Algiers refuses dialogue with JNIM, its access to the FLA could nonetheless facilitate mediation between Tuareg rebels and Bamako. It is precisely as a mediator that Algiers could play a structuring role and appears to wish to reposition itself in the Sahel.
These attacks also coincide with Washington’s attempts to re-engage with Bamako. In February 2026, Nick Checker, head of the Bureau of African Affairs at the Department of State, visited Mali to “express the United States’ respect for Mali’s sovereignty.” This rapprochement is part of the new Trump administration’s approach to the three AES juntas to counter Russian influence. These attacks further weaken an interlocutor with whom the United States is trying to reconnect.
Regional contagion: a fragmented threat?
The April 25 attacks signal entry into a new phase, characterized by greater coordination, wider geographical diffusion, and collaboration between two actors with distinct agendas. However, the risk of regional contagion manifests unevenly and requires distinguishing the specific rationales of each actor.
The FLA, driven by a nationalist agenda focused on Azawad, has neither the mandate nor the interest to operate beyond northern Mali. Its logic is territorial and identity-based, not transnational. It does not pose a destabilizing threat to Burkina Faso, Niger, or the coastal states.
JNIM, conversely, possesses a demonstrated regional projection capability. It operates in Burkina Faso and Niger and is extending its pressure towards the Gulf of Guinea. A sustained weakening of the Malian Armed Forces, or even a collapse of the junta, would provide JNIM with an expanded sanctuary from which to intensify these operations. Burkina Faso and Niger, whose political survival is partly linked to Bamako’s, would be the first exposed to these developments.
This divergence of agendas raises questions about the durability of the coalition between the two groups. Their rapprochement is based on a common adversary rather than a shared political project. The coalition can endure as long as the war against the junta remains the primary objective. It will most likely fracture once the question of the aftermath arises, and control of Kidal will serve as a revealing initial test.
Further west, Sénégal and Mauritania, largely spared until now, are not immune. They represent the primary access routes for fuel and goods to landlocked Mali, axes that JNIM is already actively targeting in the Kayes region. JNIM does not pose an immediate existential threat to these countries, but the trajectory is concerning. Several attacks could occur at the borders, further exposing these economies to Mali’s security shifts.
In the Gulf of Guinea, the threat to Bénin and Togo, already experiencing incursions, follows a different logic. These countries are not directly threatened by the Malian situation, but by what it could trigger downstream. The instability of Burkina Faso, a border country, constitutes the main vector of contagion towards the coastal states. A further deterioration in Burkina Faso, which a collapse in Bamako would make more probable, would be the most immediate threatening scenario for them.
However, the threat is not solely external. An internal coup in Mali cannot be ruled out. The junta has simultaneously intensified its internal repression, risking accelerating its own fragilization. As Wassim Nasr emphasizes, this radicalization of the regime could reinforce opponents’ belief that the only way to remove the junta is through an internal overthrow. Such a scenario would offer JNIM an additional window of opportunity to consolidate its gains. Ultimately, these attacks reveal the accumulated fragilities of a regional security system relying on contested external partners and a Malian state whose legitimacy erodes as its capacity to protect the population diminishes.
