Urgent diplomacy: AES and ECOWAS seek common ground on security and economy
At the heart of diplomatic initiatives to normalise relations between ECOWAS and AES countries, security urgency and shared economic interests drive a return to realism and pragmatism in West Africa.
Over the past few weeks, efforts have multiplied across West Africa to rebuild dialogue and consultation channels between ECOWAS member states and the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). Central to these subtle approaches is the security question and the need to implement common policies that harmonise actions as much as possible, while awaiting the holy grail of pooled resources. To give this urgent diplomacy its best chance, involved actors must observe several tacit requirements: sidestep the dispute over the three AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS; ignore the resentment generated by hostile communication campaigns from AES regimes against certain regional countries; and overcome the consequences of geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel, which has imposed a cold war climate between AES and ECOWAS. In short, bury grievances, move past tensions and inappropriate pride to face today’s common challenges.
Ivory Coast ‘ready to resume cooperation’
Among the strong signals of this shift are recent statements by Ivory Coast’s defence minister, Tene Birahima Ouattara. On 15 June, he said he is ‘sincerely ready to resume security cooperation’ with Mali and Burkina Faso, arguing that ‘terrorism, as it currently presents itself, cannot be defeated by a single state. There must be collaboration, a pooling of forces.’ This obvious point is worth repeating at a time when some decision-makers warn that the consequences of the security crisis in the Sahel ‘could become unsustainable in the medium term’ for the entire region.
How will Mali and Burkina Faso respond to this call from Ivory Coast? Nothing yet suggests a collective surge of lucidity from all relevant actors to jointly produce solutions for these urgent issues. Even if Mali and Burkina Faso’s leaders admit that breaking with ECOWAS ‘does not exclude bilateral cooperation’, it is difficult for them to suddenly change their positioning toward the Ivorian counterpart. Regularly accused of hosting terrorist elements ‘financed’ or ‘sponsored’ by French imperialism, Ivory Coast is a prime target in the AES’s manufacture of external, even imaginary, enemies. And though these accusations have never been supported by facts or evidence, they feed the doctrinaire narrative of regimes born from coups that led to their withdrawal from ECOWAS. Yet, despite these deleterious diplomatic relations, Ivory Coast maintains discreet channels of exchange and cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, whose nationals enjoy refugee status by the thousands on Ivorian soil.
‘New era’ for Benin and Niger
Also targeted by these same accusations, Benin’s new president, Romuald Wadagni, shortly after his inauguration on 24 May, initiated gestures of rapprochement or appeasement toward AES countries. Special mention goes to Niger, whose shared border with Benin has remained closed since the aftermath of the July 2023 coup in Niamey. With all dialogue impossible between the two countries, the arrival of a new leader in Benin served as an opportunity to end what had become a vulgar personal quarrel between Nigerien military authorities and former Beninese president Patrice Talon.
The change at Benin’s presidency has thus acted as an accelerator of ‘reconciliation’ between these two neighbours. In this context, a meeting of Nigerien and Beninese experts took place in Cotonou on 20-21 June to draft terms for new cooperation, mainly on defence, security, and conditions for reopening the common border—a key factor for resuming economic activities between Benin and Niger. On this last point, the Nigerien delegation emphasised its wish to obtain more information about the alleged presence of ‘foreign elements’ at the Benin-Niger border. This request echoes the persistent suspicion by Niamey’s military government that Benin hosts a ‘French military base’ intended to ‘destabilise Niger’ or ‘finance terrorism’. An accusation that defies common sense: why would Benin ‘finance’ terrorism when it is itself a target and victim? Such statements are now routine in the narrative of AES regimes struggling to slow the continuous deterioration of security on their territories. Their promise to unite military means to fight terrorism has not moved beyond speeches. Today, large swaths of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have become grey zones administered by terrorist armed groups, whose expansion and formidable project the ruling juntas cannot contain.
Thus, the hour of reconciliation has come for Niger and Benin. According to Niger’s Interior and Security Minister, Mohamed Toumba, ‘a new era is opening’ for the two countries. He stated, ‘By choosing dialogue rather than confrontation, we have created value for our economies and security for our populations.’ Nigerien and Beninese actors are aware that behind the security challenge lies the equally crucial economic one, in a space where populations share linked destinies. At a time when diplomacy of realism and pragmatism is returning, what is happening between Benin and Niger looks like a textbook case or a pilot event for a re-evaluated and intelligent management of shared vulnerabilities in the common West African space.
Endogenous responses to the security crisis
Initiatives to ‘normalise’ relations between ECOWAS and AES countries are expected to become even clearer in the coming months. Besides reactivating the neighbourhood logics that have prevailed for decades in this region, they highlight the urgency of endogenous responses to the security equation. This echoes recommendations made last year by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for ‘a resumption of dialogue among all West African countries’. In December 2025, Russia, a privileged partner of AES countries, sent the first signals of a diplomatic recalibration in West Africa by calling for ‘the pursuit of pragmatic and mutually beneficial dialogue between ECOWAS and AES, to find common solutions to counter common challenges and threats, including the fight against regional terrorism.’ These words indicate a paradigm shift in international cooperation, essentially reminding Africans that it is up to them alone to craft the most efficient solutions to their current challenges.
Already, bilateral relational protocols are observed between AES and certain countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Togo and Senegal. Despite their withdrawal from ECOWAS, the Sahel’s military regimes have maintained their presence in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and their nationals continue to benefit from the principle of free movement within the ECOWAS space. Ultimately, one will have to question the merits of the AES promoters’ withdrawal from the regional community. The only available answer refers back to the initial dispute: ECOWAS’s condemnation of the coups that occurred in AES countries, and especially the refusal of that entity’s leaders to work toward a ‘restoration of constitutional order’. In many respects, the break between AES and ECOWAS resembles an artificial or incomplete divorce.
