Mali rebel offensive analysis: unfolding crisis and future risks

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Mali crisis deepens as rebel offensive gains ground

Middle East and Africa

Mali crisis deepens as rebel offensive gains ground

Author

Jonathan Guiffard

Associate Expert – Defense and Africa

In Mali, the junta led by Assimi Goïta, backed by Russia, faces growing instability following a major offensive launched on April 25 by jihadists from the JNIM (affiliated with Al-Qaïda) and separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). The northern regions, including key cities like Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou, risk falling under rebel control—a scenario reminiscent of the 2012 crisis. While Western military intervention seems unlikely, the rebels’ objectives and Moscow’s response remain unclear. How should European nations prepare for the emergence of a new jihadist proto-state in Mali? Analyst Jonathan Guiffard examines the escalating risks for civilians and the deepening fragmentation of the Sahel.

On April 25, 2026, Mali witnessed a coordinated military offensive by the JNIM—a branch of Al-Qaïda in the Sahel—and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) against Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian allies, the Afrika Korps. The assault, marking a new phase in the conflict with Bamako, echoes the 2012 takeover of northern Mali by a similar coalition, though the political landscape has since shifted dramatically.

What sets the 2026 offensive apart from 2012? What short-term outcomes can be anticipated?

The current context: an unprecedented offensive

On April 25, the rebels launched their most ambitious operation in years, targeting five key Malian cities: Bamako, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. This marks the first time since 2012 that jihadists and separatists have coordinated such a large-scale assault. While past coordination was sporadic, this offensive demonstrates a concrete partnership. Battles erupted across all five cities, with rebel forces focusing on FAMa and Russian positions. In Bamako, symbolic sites—including the Kati military district and the airport—were hit.

A partial assessment of the operation reveals:

Northern cities have fallen under rebel and jihadist control. Kidal, along with nearby Tessalit and Anéfis, is now in rebel hands. Other key towns—Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit—have also been seized, encircling Gao and Tombouctou. However, some Malian-Russian military bases in the north, including those in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok, remain under government control.
Junta leaders have been directly targeted. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was killed, while National Security Agency chief General Modibo Koné was injured. President Assimi Goïta, the junta’s leader, was reportedly evacuated to Turkey’s embassy before reappearing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials. Rumors of a potential coup by General Malick Diaw circulated but were unconfirmed—though the attack has undeniably shaken the junta’s leadership.
While the junta’s grip on power has weakened, the situation remains fluid. The rebels’ unexpected strategy—spared massacres of captured soldiers—has further destabilized Bamako’s legitimacy.

Several key differences from 2012 stand out:

JNIM and FLA are coordinating closely, with JNIM allowing FLA leaders to take a public role. Unlike past leaders like Elghabass Ag Intallah and Bilal Ag Cherif, JNIM figures such as Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun Kouffa remain out of sight, with only Sidan Ag Hitta, a senior JNIM cadre, spotted in Tessalit.
Instead of executing captured soldiers, the rebels are prioritizing negotiation and disarmament. They allow FAMa forces to withdraw peacefully, framing themselves as protectors of both civilians and soldiers against Bamako’s oppressive junta.
Negotiations with Russian mercenaries facilitated their withdrawal from key northern bases. This mirrors tactics seen in Syria, with Algeria likely playing a mediating role in coordination with the FLA.
The rebels’ northern conquest relied on a strategy to pin down FAMa forces in central Mali and Bamako simultaneously. Prolonged fighting in the capital marks a first for the conflict.

Negotiations with Russian mercenaries allowed them to evacuate key northern bases without resistance, mirroring tactics observed in Syria.

This offensive highlights the rebels’ strategic evolution since 2012. Rather than seeking visible territorial control, they now focus on suffocating the junta through blockades and localized pressure. By April 28, the JNIM had imposed a full blockade on Bamako, burning transport trucks to signal its resolve while the junta scrambled to organize supply convoys for the capital.

Unlike 2012–2013, the Malian regime, FAMa, and their Russian allies have not collapsed entirely. They’ve attempted to regain the initiative through sweeping military operations. Yet Bamako’s situation remains precarious. Civil society voices, including political figures like Oumar Mariko and former minister Mamadou Ismaïla Konaté, imam Mahmoud Dicko, and the Sahel Democrats Alliance (based in Brussels), are urging negotiations, criticizing the junta’s reliance on military force alone.

The Islamic State’s Sahel Province (EIWS) launched an attack on Ménaka but was repelled by Malian-Russian forces. Though not part of the JNIM/FLA offensive, the EIWS remains a persistent threat in northeastern Mali.

An anticipated crisis

As early as September 2022, it was evident that Russia’s military support in Mali was a losing strategy. Far from stabilizing the region, Moscow’s involvement alienated civilians and failed to curb the JNIM’s expansion. By January 2023, a forward-looking analysis predicted key developments:

Tensions between the CMA (Coordinated Armed Movements) and FAMa/Wagner forces would reignite armed clashes in the north, with the CMA aligning with the JNIM to regain control over the Niger loop and potentially half of northern Mali.
The fragmentation of central Mali would deepen, with the Macina Katibat clashing regularly against community self-defense militias. The latter would likely fail to assert control, gradually ceding the region to the JNIM.
Bamako’s outskirts would come under siege, though full occupation remains unlikely absent a total military collapse.
The loss of northern Mali would trigger political turmoil, forcing negotiations with the JNIM to define a lasting truce. This could involve territorial concessions or constitutional changes, with religious institutions pressuring the government to engage in dialogue.

In November 2023, after FAMa and Russian forces briefly retook Kidal, it was clear the victory was short-lived. The CMA had strategically retreated, preparing for a future counteroffensive—a trend that culminated in the recent rebel gains. These events confirm that the current crisis was foreseeable, allowing us to explore probable short-term outcomes.

Short-term perspectives

Militarily, the JNIM/FLA coalition will likely secure the withdrawal of Russian forces from northern bases before targeting Gao and Tombouctou, effectively splitting Mali as it did in 2012. Historically, the fall of Kidal preceded coordinated assaults on Gao and Tombouctou, with mass desertions among Malian troops accelerating the collapse. Today, with FAMa’s command structure disrupted and political instability in Bamako, further defections are probable. If Russian forces withdraw from Gao and Tombouctou, the rebels’ conquest of the Niger loop becomes inevitable.

The only factor that could delay this outcome is the deployment of Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s TB2 drones. While the JNIM/FLA could neutralize Malian drones, targeting Burkinabé or Nigerien drones would prove far more challenging.

The north of Mali is poised to fall under FLA and JNIM control, particularly as both groups have moderated their objectives. The FLA seeks de facto autonomy for the Azawad without pursuing full political separation, while the JNIM appears content with a less stringent application of Islamic law. This reduces the likelihood of a repeat of the 2012 scenario, where jihadists imposed brutal governance in captured cities after clashing with Arab-Tuareg allies. The 2013 failure of the jihadist coalition (AQMI, MUJAO, Ansar Charia, Ansar Eddine) against French forces led AQMI leaders to advocate for a softer expansion strategy, prioritizing proselytization over violent control.

Controlling northern Mali would position the rebels advantageously, but they would face two new fronts: the Islamic State in the Ménaka region and aerial incursions by Malian and Burkinabé forces.

Unlike 2012, JNIM fighters are now active in central Mali. The northern offensive may be accompanied by renewed attacks on Malian garrisons in Gossi, Boni, Hombori, Niafunké, Konna, Mopti, and Sévaré. Without FLA support in these areas, operations will likely aim to disrupt FAMa’s cohesion rather than seize urban centers. Recent retaliatory attacks by jihadists on civilian villages in Kori-Kori and Gomossogou underscore this strategy’s violent contradictions, risking backlash against the rebels’ self-proclaimed image as protectors against junta abuses. The JNIM’s leadership struggles to control its factions, a vulnerability their cadres acknowledge.

The fate of central and southern Mali is harder to predict for two reasons: First, the JNIM has gradually occupied rural areas, besieging cities and negotiating local agreements with communities in exchange for Islamic law enforcement—a strategy akin to the Viet Cong’s tactics in Vietnam or the Taliban’s in Afghanistan. Second, unlike the Taliban, the JNIM lacks the manpower for large-scale territorial occupation.

The 2012–2013 control of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou enabled jihadist groups to recruit extensively from central Mali’s communities. If this pattern repeats, the JNIM could significantly strengthen its ranks.

The siege of Bamako is a calculated strategy to strangle the junta, either forcing regime change or coercing negotiations.

The siege of Bamako is a calculated strategy to strangle the junta, either forcing regime change or coercing negotiations. Despite propaganda efforts, the junta’s inability to manage the crisis is evident. Assimi Goïta, like Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, is trapped in Bamako. Growing mistrust between Goïta and Russia—exacerbated by the recent offensive—further destabilizes the junta. With key pro-Russian figures like Sadio Camara and Modibo Koné sidelined, the partnership with Moscow is on shaky ground. If the partnership collapses entirely, the northern and central regions could fall rapidly. Ongoing negotiations and months of tensions between FAMa and Russian mercenaries—who have criticized the national army since the Tinzawaten defeat—add to the pressure.

Unless forced into negotiations, the junta has little incentive to abandon its Russian partnership if it hopes to survive. If Bamako continues paying Moscow, Russian forces may maintain a protective presence in the capital, though territorial recovery remains unlikely. If Russia withdraws, Mali’s options are limited to minimal support from Burkina Faso and Niger, both embroiled in their own jihadist conflicts. Senegal may mobilize along its border but is unlikely to send troops into Mali, given the JNIM’s growing threat there. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire are expected to adopt a wait-and-see approach, privately welcoming the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.

Looking ahead:

The fall of northern Mali is inevitable, and the loss of central regions is only a matter of time. The timeline remains uncertain, but the balance of power is clear.
The Russian partnership is fragile and doomed to fail, as is Bamako’s military strategy. Recent events have made this abundantly clear.
Two potential turning points could emerge:
- A negotiated settlement, either due to the junta’s collapse or diplomatic pressure.
- A foreign military intervention to shift the balance of power and reverse long- and medium-term trends.

Mali and the international community: navigating the crisis

In this context, several potential scenarios—non-exclusive—are emerging:

Scenario 1: The prospect of foreign military intervention

What happens if the JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Pre-2022, this would have triggered Western military intervention to dismantle the jihadist movement.

This crisis raises a critical question: what happens if the JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Before 2022, such a move would have prompted Western military intervention (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali) to dismantle the jihadist movement. However, the withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan and the Sahel has rendered this option increasingly unlikely. Given these constraints, is regional or international military intervention desirable, feasible, or realistic?

Regionally, only Algeria’s army could reverse the balance of power, but historical doctrine and current political alignments make intervention improbable. Mauritania has maintained a non-aggression pact with AQMI and the JNIM since 2010. Other regional armies have already confronted jihadists and shown limited success, suggesting they will prioritize defensive postures. An international intervention remains the only plausible option to temporarily stabilize the situation, much like Operation Barkhane. France is unlikely to return to the Sahel, the UN is disengaged, and Europe will not act alone. The U.S. is focused on other theaters, leaving the Sahel a low priority. These factors inevitably steer the international community toward negotiations.

Scenario 2: The prospect of large-scale political negotiations

Since 2025, JNIM leaders have pursued a strategy akin to Syria’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), seeking gradual normalization through a more moderate Islamic governance model and engagement with the international community. To achieve this, the JNIM has sought a sponsor since 2024, potentially Algeria or Mauritania—both of which maintain close ties with FLA leaders and JNIM cadres while opposing Bamako’s junta. However, it remains uncertain whether either country would accept this role.

This strategy anticipates a rebel campaign to collapse the junta, followed by negotiations with a political force willing to accommodate their demands: implementation of Islamic law nationwide, increased autonomy for northern and central regions, and integration of the JNIM and FLA into local governance.

A major obstacle remains: unlike HTS, the JNIM has not severed its allegiance to Al-Qaïda, nor has it shown willingness to abandon its goal of exporting jihadist ideology beyond Mali’s borders. Additionally, the JNIM lacks formal dialogue with the international community, complicating efforts to normalize its status. As it stands, the political framework for negotiations is unfavorable.

A comprehensive negotiation would require discussions with both the FLA—building on the Algiers Accords—and the JNIM, leveraging local agreements with the High Islamic Council of Mali. Without pressure from Russia, Turkey, or African partners (such as Togo and Ghana), progress remains unlikely. With Bamako’s junta entrenched and opposition systematically repressed since 2020, the impetus for change must come from external actors. Until negotiations begin, the siege strategy will continue, with captured cities serving as launchpads for further rebel offensives.

Long-term, France and Europe must recognize that the emergence of a jihadist proto-state in Mali will require sustained monitoring, much like in Syria and Afghanistan, to mitigate potential terrorist threats. Regional and Arab partners must be mobilized to contain and normalize these actors on the international stage.