Mali’s challenging path: five years after the 2020 military takeover

Politique

Mali’s challenging path: five years after the 2020 military takeover

Exactly five years have passed since Assimi Goïta seized power in Mali through a military coup. While his leadership has drawn significant criticism, it also maintains a degree of public support. This analysis delves into the complex reality on the ground.

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Portrait d'Assimi Goïta

This Sunday marks five years since General Assimi Goïta assumed control of Mali through a coup d’état. Since then, the Malian population has faced a worsening situation, characterized by declining security, restricted freedom of expression, and diminished press freedom.

To gain further insight, I spoke with Ulf Laessing, the Sahel Program Director for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali.

Interview with Ulf Laessing

Ulf Laessing observes that repression has intensified. Open discourse is no longer as straightforward as it once was. While candid conversations are still possible among trusted individuals in Mali, a palpable sense of caution now prevails. This represents a clear criticism of the current government. Moreover, critical voices have been imprisoned, and others have been compelled into exile.

Portait d'Ulf Laessing, directeur du programme Sahel de la fondation Konrad Adenauer au Mali

Reporter: What improvements, if any, have the Malian people experienced since the military took power?

Ulf Laessing: Initially, certain parts of the country saw a slight improvement in security. The road to Ségou, for instance, remained open for an extended period, allowing some farmers to return to their fields.

However, that is no longer the case. The crisis has persisted and deepened. Coupled with immense population growth, climate change, and pervasive insecurity, I am highly pessimistic that any government, regardless of who is in power, can significantly alter the trajectory of the situation.

Qui finance le JNIM et le FLA qui ont attaqué le Mali ?

Reporter: In 2020, the military assumed power with the explicit goal of eradicating jihadist groups. That objective appears to be largely unfulfilled.

Ulf Laessing: Indeed, JNIM and the Islamic State effectively control significant portions of the country. I believe no government will succeed in reclaiming these areas, whether through another coup or a future elected administration. My outlook for pacifying Mali remains rather bleak.

Reporter: In late April, coordinated attacks were even carried out by jihadists and Tuareg rebels.

Ulf Laessing: Yes, that was a profound shock. It represented the largest assault since 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadists briefly seized control of the north before French forces intervened a year later. This was a direct, frontal attack against the Malian state. While the government has managed to remain in place, they have lost control of certain northern territories. It doesn’t appear the rebels are making further advances at this moment, but it’s undeniably a loss of prestige for the authorities. It was a dramatic attack, unforeseen by anyone, especially the Russians, who were ostensibly brought in to enhance security.

Reporter: And it’s precisely these Russian mercenaries who, in essence, withdrew without truly engaging in combat. Mali’s allies, Niger and Burkina Faso, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), issued statements but offered no military support. This left Mali feeling quite isolated. How do you explain this situation in West Africa?

Ulf Laessing: With the Russians, there was always more show than substance. They have approximately 1,500 to 2,000 mercenaries on the ground, which is only a third of the French contingent, and even France struggled to pacify the entire country. The Russians, through their brutal methods, have arguably exacerbated the conflict. Ultimately, it was a humiliation when they retreated from Kidal and two other northern localities without a fight. We didn’t see much assistance from Niger or Burkina Faso either. They claimed to have provided air support, but in reality, Mali was largely on its own that day. This wasn’t surprising, as Niger and Burkina Faso are themselves grappling with their own jihadist insurgencies. I don’t believe they possess the capacity to assist Mali, even if they had the desire to do so.

Des soldats du FLA dans une voiture, traversant une caserne antérieurement utilisée par l'Africa-Corps à Kidal

Reporter: So, the solidarity constantly touted by the three AES states is perhaps not as robust as believed?

Ulf Laessing: Politically, they are very close and share many aspirations. However, they lack both the political will and, critically, the capabilities to bring these projects to fruition. The three military leaders are indeed united – reflecting their shared ideology. But these are also three of the world’s poorest nations. Therefore, one must be realistic about what this cooperation can achieve. This isn’t the EU building roads together or NATO providing mutual defense. These are three extremely impoverished countries fighting for their very survival.

Assimi Goïta, Abdourahamane Tiani et Ibrahim Traore côte à côte

Reporter: What might a viable solution look like for Mali?

Ulf Laessing: A positive aspect is that the Malian people do not desire Sharia law or Islamist rule. This sentiment could have sparked widespread protests in Mali, despite the inherent dangers and repression. But it’s clearly not what the population wants.

My hope is that this underlying sentiment can be leveraged, leading eventually to genuine negotiations with the more moderate elements among the jihadist groups, fostering a path towards dialogue.

Reporter: But what could possibly be negotiated? Jihadists aim to control the country and impose Sharia. How can one negotiate with such entities?

Ulf Laessing: I don’t believe JNIM is capable of controlling a city like Bamako or the entire country. What they seek is to be left undisturbed. They want to control specific regions and establish arrangements with other factions. In Bamako, they might desire a government that is perhaps more inclined towards Sharia and open to negotiating with them.

Unlike some situations in the Middle East, the jihadists here are not foreign invaders seeking to inflict violence for its own sake. They are locals. Their grievances often revolve around access to water and land, which the jihadists exploit. At some point, I believe discussions will become unavoidable. Military action is necessary, but so is dialogue with moderate individuals. In Mali, there are already subtle pressures for this approach emerging in various quarters.

Des personnes avec des bidons d'eau dans lac asséché de Faguibine dans la région du Tombouctou.

Mauritania faced a similar challenge. Their response combined military force with compromises. For example, alcohol is no longer available, and the country is designated an Islamic Republic. It demonstrates that a full ‘Taliban program’ isn’t always necessary. It might be possible to reach some form of understanding that satisfies the country’s needs. Once instability is curbed, the state will naturally have greater capacity to act.

Reporter: And what do the people of Mali truly want?

Ulf Laessing: The people in Bamako do not want to live under Sharia law. We observed this during the late April attacks: there were no widespread protests or strong calls for the government to resign. This is because people understand that if the current government departs, the next one could be even more Islamist. And that is not what they desire.

Despite all criticisms against the military government, it must be stated: many people still support it because they reject the alternatives. They don’t want jihadists, nor do they want the old, corrupt elites who were perceived as tied to France and Europe. Therefore, I believe that if no further major attacks occur, the government will likely remain in power, given the public support it commands.

Reporter: So, you don’t feel that the impression conveyed by social media is misleading, and that in reality, a significant portion of the population, particularly the youth, supports Assimi Goïta’s government?

Ulf Laessing: The average age in Mali is 15 years. Many no longer attend school. They have no ties to Europe or France. Their primary source of information is social media, which is rife with propaganda, including disinformation disseminated by Russians to bolster the government. I still believe there is support for the government. After the late April attacks, it would have been an opportune moment for protests, as the regime was weakened. The same was true in the autumn when fuel deliveries were blocked. Yet, no one protested, clearly indicating that the people do not want to be governed by JNIM.

De la fumée sur les routes de Bamako

Reporter: Perhaps they are simply too preoccupied with their basic survival, a situation now exacerbated by the blockade imposed on Bamako?

Ulf Laessing: Life has certainly become significantly more difficult, even before these recent attacks. People have grown resigned. They have lost all illusions about politicians. And it must also be said that the traditional parties and older politicians have lost much credibility. Many of them have already held power, and nothing truly improved. This is why many are now saying: let’s give those currently in power another chance.