Despite shifts in power and radical geopolitical realignments, Niamey remains caught in a war of attrition. From Mahamadou Issoufou’s Western alliance strategy to Abdourahamane Tiani’s sovereignty-driven break, the grim reality on the ground persists: terrorist threats are not retreating.
Three presidents, two democratic transitions, one coup d’état — and one constant: bloodshed in the “three borders” zone and the Lake Chad basin. In Niger, regimes come and go, but the jihadist hydra, embodied by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), remains.
While the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), which seized power in July 2023, vowed to restore security by ejecting Western partners, the country now faces a harsh reality check. It’s time to take stock of a war that, so far, seems unwinnable.
The Issoufou-Bazoum era: The illusion of a Western shield
Under President Mahamadou Issoufou (2011–2021), Niger positioned itself as the anchor of Western strategy in the Sahel. With neighboring Mali’s state collapsing, Niamey became the military hub for France’s Operation Barkhane and the United States’ drone base in Agadez.
His successor, Mohamed Bazoum, added a layer of political flexibility:
- An “outstretched hand” approach by initiating dialogues with some repentants.
- Massive investment in training Nigerien special forces.
The flip side: this strategy prevented the country’s collapse but never eradicated the threat. Worse, foreign troop presence fueled deep frustration within parts of the military and population, who saw it as a loss of sovereignty for insufficient results.
Tiani’s gamble: Sovereignty tested by bullets
When General Abdourahamane Tiani and the CNSP overthrew Mohamed Bazoum on July 26, 2023, they justified the coup by “the ongoing deterioration of the security situation.” What followed is well known: a dramatic break with Paris and Washington, creation of the Sahel States Alliance (AES) with Mali and Burkina Faso, and a strategic rapprochement with Russia (via the Africa Corps) and Turkey.
On the communications front, the shift is radical. The military government exalts national pride and promises a purely military response, free of Western “hidden agendas.”
The harsh reality on the ground
Yet reports from UN observers and strategic studies centers agree: the departure of Western forces left an immediate capability gap, especially in aerial intelligence and technological surveillance.
Complex attacks are multiplying, sometimes targeting entire Nigerien army (FDS) garrisons and causing heavy losses. The subsequent economic blockade in certain regions and diplomatic isolation complicate the logistics of funding a war that costs millions of dollars daily.
Why is Niger stuck in this deadlock?
The common mistake of successive regimes — civilian or military — lies in treating a crisis that is primarily political and social as a purely military one. Two grand visions have failed:
On one side, the Issoufou-Bazoum doctrine bet everything on integration into the international security architecture. Its major weakness was excessive external dependence, disconnected from popular aspirations, making the French narrative inaudible to much of the Nigerien public.
On the other, the Tiani doctrine favors a total geopolitical rupture and martial sovereignty embodied by the AES. The limits of this formula are already visible: an immediate loss of cutting-edge technological intelligence, suffocating financial isolation, and paradoxically, an escalation of violence by armed groups exploiting regional disorganization.
In both cases, the roots of the problem remain unchanged: state absence in peripheral areas, lack of economic prospects for rural youth, and intercommunal conflicts (especially between herders and farmers) that jihadist groups skillfully exploit for recruitment.
Whether waged to the tune of international cooperation or under the banners of AES sovereignty, the war in Niger cannot be won by weapons alone. For General Tiani, the challenge is no longer just criticizing his predecessors’ record, but proving that the current military formula can protect Nigeriens. Without a massive reintroduction of public services — schools, justice, clinics — into insecure zones, Niger risks seeing this war, indeed, lost in the long term.
