The Sahel has vanished from global headlines, overshadowed by geopolitical upheavals worldwide. Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shifted European attention eastward, while the renewed Israel-Palestine conflict in 2023 and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s rebel offensives in 2024 dominated media cycles. Even the dismantling of U.S. institutions by the new Trump administration failed to draw sustained focus. Yet, beneath this silence lies a worsening reality: over a decade of unaddressed crises in the Sahel continues to deepen.
Military regimes that seized power in recent coups across the Sahel vowed to eradicate jihadist violence, but their promises remain unfulfilled. Instead, armed groups have gained ground, escalating deadly attacks on civilians in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—the three nations that formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. Today, the region is the global epicenter of jihadist violence, with civilian casualties mounting at an alarming rate.
Compounding the crisis is a stark authoritarian turn in these countries. Transitions to constitutional rule and democratic elections have been indefinitely postponed, while dissenting voices face suppression. Media freedom has eroded sharply: local and foreign journalists are silenced, forced into exile, or intimidated, and civil society organizations operate under constant threat—arbitrary arrests, forced military conscription, and even extrajudicial killings have become disturbingly common.
This analysis examines recent security and political developments in the Sahel, focusing on AES member states. It explores the relentless advance of jihadist violence, assesses the political landscape, and urges the European Union and its member states to maintain engagement despite international distractions. Understanding these dynamics is critical, as their repercussions extend far beyond Africa’s borders.
persistent instability: jihadist expansion and local conflicts
A decade ago, the Sahel recorded the lowest number of deaths from violent extremism in Africa. By 2024, it had become the continent’s deadliest region, with jihadist-related fatalities tripling since 2021 to reach 11,200. This toll does not include the 2,430 civilians killed in 2024 by national security forces and their Russian allies, revealing a disturbing trend: state actors may have caused more civilian deaths than armed Islamist groups. Such violence has left populations in extreme vulnerability, caught between armed factions and failing state institutions.
Mali: civilians trapped between jihadists and state forces
The expulsion of the UN’s MINUSMA peacekeeping mission in 2023 was followed by a resurgence of armed clashes with Tuareg separatists in northern Mali, backed by Russian troops. Government forces now fight both separatist movements and jihadist groups, all labeled as “terrorists” by the transitional authorities. The recapture of Kidal in October 2023—a rebel stronghold for a decade—bolstered claims of restored sovereignty but did little to shift the balance of power.
In July 2024, a tactical alliance between the Coalition for the Defense of the Azawad People (CSP-DPA) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM)—affiliated with Al-Qaeda—dealt a devastating blow to Malian forces and their Wagner Group allies in Tinzaouaten, near the Algerian border. This ambush resulted in approximately 40 Malian soldiers and 80 Russian mercenaries killed, marking Wagner’s heaviest loss in the region.
By September 2024, jihadist groups escalated their campaign with simultaneous attacks on a gendarmerie school and a military airport in Bamako, killing over 70 security personnel and destroying a presidential aircraft. These high-symbolism strikes exposed the military’s inability to secure the capital and signaled a new phase of bold strategy by JNIM, which—unlike the Islamic State in the Sahel—targets military sites to gain or retain local support. Yet, civilians remain in the crossfire: a July 2024 wedding attack in Mopti killed 40 people, while August drone strikes by the Malian army in retaliation for Tinzaouaten reportedly killed over 20 civilians. Violence persisted into 2025, including a February ambush near Gao that claimed 50 lives. Despite the deteriorating security, 2024 polls revealed that Malians still express confidence in their armed forces and a perceived “rise in power.”
Burkina Faso: state retreat fuels jihadist dominance and communal violence
Since the 2022 military coup, Burkina Faso’s security situation has worsened dramatically. By 2024, reports indicated that government forces had lost control of 60% of the territory, with JNIM active in 11 of the country’s 13 regions. While exact figures are difficult to verify, on-the-ground observers confirm jihadist groups move freely across vast areas. The human toll reflects this expansion: deaths surged by 68% between 2022 and 2023, with 2024 on track to set another grim record. The deadliest attack in Burkina Faso’s history occurred in August 2024 in Barsalogho, where JNIM militants struck as civilians—pressured to assist the army—dug defensive trenches. Estimates of civilian deaths range from 130 to 600, marking one of the region’s most horrific massacres.
State forces, too, have been implicated in atrocities. In February 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that the army summarily executed at least 223 civilians in two villages. Reports of mutilated corpses and extrajudicial killings persisted throughout the year. In March, in Solenzo, civilian militias known as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) were accused of massacring Fulani civilians—targeted due to presumed links with jihadist groups. Officially framed as a successful anti-terror operation, the attack reportedly killed dozens, primarily women, children, and the elderly. In retaliation, JNIM launched a major assault on a military camp in Diapaga, killing over 30 soldiers and VDP, claiming it as “the beginning of the vengeance for Solenzo.”
The junta’s decision to arm civilians, intensified after the 2022 coup, has deepened ethnic tensions and intercommunal violence. Under a program that recruits 50,000 VDP members—offering two weeks of training, a weapon, communication tools, and a monthly stipend of 200,000 CFA francs (about €300)—the Fulani have been largely excluded, fueling resentment. VDP-controlled villages have become targets for retaliatory raids, blurring the lines between state forces, militias, jihadists, and civilians. Forced conscription of political opponents and the deployment of VDP fighters as cannon fodder have further entrenched violence. With over 2 million internally displaced persons, Burkina Faso now hosts the largest displaced population in the region.
Niger: rising jihadist lethality and state crackdowns
Though Niger was relatively less exposed to jihadist attacks than its AES neighbors, the post-2023 coup period saw a sharp rise in violence. Military operations intensified, but so did civilian casualties—both from jihadist assaults and state-led counterterrorism. Since the coup, Nigerien forces have killed three times as many civilians as in the previous year, placing communities between armed groups and state violence.
A 2024 study by the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S⁴) initiative found that state forces faced 51 attacks in just nine months, nearly double the 2023 figure. Meanwhile, non-state armed groups grew more aggressive, targeting both civilians and security personnel. In March 2024, at least 23 soldiers were killed in Tillabéri, near the Burkina Faso and Mali borders. December brought two deadly attacks in western Niger, killing 39 civilians. In March 2025, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) attacked a mosque, killing 44 people. Though Niger appears marginally more stable than its neighbors, the trend is unmistakably downward since July 2023.
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Despite shared challenges, the AES states differ in their responses to jihadist threats and local armed dynamics. Mali’s government continues collaborating with Russian forces to reclaim the north, battling both jihadists and Tuareg separatists. Burkina Faso, in contrast, avoids direct Russian involvement, opting instead to arm civilians—a strategy that has triggered a cycle of reciprocal violence with JNIM, devastating local communities. Niger, facing threats primarily from the Islamic State in the Sahel—especially along its borders with Mali—has also formed self-defense militias, though on a smaller, more controlled scale than Burkina Faso.
A common trend across AES countries is the use of large-scale, high-lethality attacks involving aerial bombardments, drones, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and mortar fire by both JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel. This evolution in tactics signals a shift toward more sophisticated and coordinated operations. While villages remain primary targets, jihadist groups have avoided direct assaults on major cities—except in Bamako—preferring rural areas where state retaliation is weaker and zakat (religious tax) collection is easier. Reports of tentative community dialogues between JNIM factions and Malian authorities in early 2025 suggest potential strategic shifts, with broader implications for the AES bloc.
endless transitions: authoritarian consolidation in the Sahel
Since seizing power, the three AES military regimes have systematically extended their transition periods and rewritten constitutions to entrench their rule. In Mali, the August 2020 coup initially set an 18-month transition with elections planned for February 2022. None were held. After negotiations with ECOWAS, a 24-month transition was announced in June 2021, with polls scheduled for February 2024. Yet by late 2023, authorities cited “technical” reasons—including a census overseen by a French firm—to justify further delays. In May 2024, a Malian dialogue recommended extending the transition by two to five years, allowing the junta leader to remain in power until 2029, with eligibility to run in elections. In October 2024, Colonel Goïta promoted himself to army general and elevated five regime allies to the same rank, signaling a firm grip on power. Though election discussions briefly resurfaced in late 2024, they vanished by early 2025.
In Burkina Faso, Captain Traoré, who led the September 2022 coup, initially pledged elections by July 2024. By late 2023, he declared polls “not a priority,” followed by constitutional reforms in early 2024. In May 2024, the transition period was extended to 60 months, keeping Traoré in office until 2029—mirroring Mali’s model. This consolidation of power was further reinforced through constitutional amendments tailored to his rule.
Niger resisted setting an election date the longest, avoiding official announcements for over 18 months. It was only after a brief “national dialogue” in February 2025 that a renewable five-year transition was proposed. Like his counterparts, General Tchiani—already promoted to army general—swore an oath in March 2025 for a five-year presidential term, consolidating his authority.
The prolonged, near-permanent transitions allow these regimes to solidify the AES confederation. Democratically elected leaders might have hesitated to pursue such regional integration or break with ECOWAS, given economic and political costs. But with guaranteed five-year mandates and the possibility of re-election, current rulers can forge new regional and international alliances—exemplified by Russia’s recent pledge of support for the AES joint force. The European Union must acknowledge this new reality as it reconsiders its engagement strategy in the Sahel.
authoritarian drift: controlling information when territory slips away
Unable to assert full territorial control, the AES regimes have tightened their grip on information. Independent and foreign media outlets have been banned or suspended, foreign journalists expelled, and local reporters intimidated or arbitrarily detained. Political parties and civil society organizations face suspension or intense surveillance.
In Mali, the Goïta government has systematically restricted free expression since 2020. By 2022, RFI and France 24 were banned, and Joliba TV News was temporarily suspended. In November 2024, Burkina Faso’s media regulator alerted Malian authorities about a program depicting a staged coup, leading to the withdrawal of Joliba TV’s broadcasting license—a sign of growing coordination among AES regimes to control narratives. Between 2022 and 2024, critics of the transition faced arbitrary arrests and harassment, including the expulsion of the UN human rights chief in February 2023. By late 2023 and early 2024, several NGOs were shut down, and in 2024, political parties were suspended for three months with a media blackout on their activities.
In Burkina Faso, Captain Traoré’s regime expelled foreign journalists without justification, banned RFI and France 24, and suspended Jeune Afrique for allegedly discrediting the military. In 2024, TV5Monde was suspended for airing a critical interview with a former electoral commission president. Early 2025 saw a new wave of repression targeting exiled media and opponents, placed on “terrorist lists” to intimidate. In March, three journalists were abducted, reappearing ten days later in military uniforms in a video where they claimed to be “covering the reality on the ground”—a clear case of forced conscription.
Niger followed suit within a week of its 2023 coup by suspending RFI and France 24. Other media outlets have since been shut down, and journalists covering security issues face intimidation and imprisonment. Human rights organizations have documented arbitrary detentions—including former President Mohamed Bazoum and seven cabinet members—forced disappearances, violations of fair trial rights, and attacks on press freedom. Political parties have been suspended since July 2023, silencing formal opposition. Since October 2024, authorities have detained foreign passports at Niamey International Airport until departure, complicating travel and research.
By controlling information and civil society, these regimes impose their version of reality. In October 2024, Burkina Faso claimed to control 70% of its territory—a figure matching the percentage attributed to jihadist groups by external research. For citizens, discerning the true state of affairs has become nearly impossible.
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The Sahel has received scant media coverage over the past year, overshadowed by global crises and compounded by the repression of independent journalism in AES states and waning Western public interest following forced withdrawals from the region. Yet, as this analysis has shown, the silence surrounding the Sahel is not a sign of stability—it is a harbinger of deepening crisis.
All the crises that once justified European and Western engagement remain unresolved and are worsening. Jihadist expansion continues unabated, while food insecurity reaches catastrophic levels: between June and August 2025, an estimated 52.7 million people in West Africa face acute hunger. The number of internally displaced persons has skyrocketed to over 3.1 million across Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad as of March 2025.
The Sahel may no longer be a strategic priority for the European Union, distracted by other emergencies. But it would be a mistake to assume its crises will not reverberate across Europe in the medium to long term. Withdrawing from the Sahel is not just about breaking ties with military regimes—it is about abandoning the people living there.
As the EU reassesses its approach—marked by a quieter French presence—cautious steps toward re-engagement have begun, including through the new EU Special Representative. Before proceeding further, Europe must clarify its priorities in a region increasingly open to new partners. What does it aim to achieve? What can it realistically accomplish? And with whom?
What is clear is that in an increasingly polarized world, strengthening bonds, knowledge exchange, and solidarity across continents, regions, and societies is essential to confronting global challenges together.
