On 9 October 2026, the Tessit area near the Burkina Faso border became the scene of heavy fighting between the JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel. Beyond the competing claims issued by both organisations, the clashes force a central question into the open: why do armed groups keep operating in the very territories that military authorities insist they are securing?
A battle with two versions and one clear reality
Violent clashes erupted on the morning of Friday 9 October 2026 between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-S) in the Tessit area, along the frontier with Burkina Faso.
Accounts close to the JNIM say its rival suffered a heavy defeat on several fronts. Accounts close to IS-S claim the opposite, asserting that the JNIM was routed and that new zones were captured.
These contradictory narratives cannot, on their own, establish the true outcome of the fighting. They do, however, reveal a troubling reality: armed groups are still fighting over territory in the Sahel, while civilians remain exposed to insecurity, forced displacement and the fallout of a war that shows no sign of ending.
The contradiction the juntas can no longer avoid
The clashes expose a major inconsistency in the security narrative of the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, which are grouped within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Since taking power, the military authorities have made the recovery of sovereignty and the fight against terrorism central pillars of their legitimacy. Yet the persistence of armed groups and their ability to move, organise and fight raises hard questions about the effectiveness of the strategies being pursued.
The core problem is not merely the existence of terrorist groups. It is also the enduring difficulty states face in preventing these groups from establishing a lasting presence on their soil. Tessit illustrates this: while the two organisations battle for positions, civilians continue to bear the cost of an insecurity that refuses to disappear despite repeated promises to restore order.
AES authorities regularly denounce foreign interference and, depending on the circumstances, accuse certain neighbouring countries of facilitating armed group activity or serving as rear bases for fighters. Such accusations must be weighed against verifiable evidence. The presence of terrorist groups on a country’s territory does not, by itself, prove that its leaders support or knowingly host them.
One question remains unavoidable: how can military governments justify their security record when armed groups continue to operate in areas where the state struggles to reassert lasting authority?
Sovereignty rhetoric versus conditions on the ground
A key challenge for Sahelian military regimes is now to demonstrate that their strategic choices are producing concrete results. Switching military partners, expelling Western forces and moving closer to Russia were presented as ways to regain control of the security situation.
But these changes alone are not enough to eliminate armed groups. Persistent difficulties in Mali and violence across various Sahel regions are a reminder that counterterrorism also depends on intelligence, an effective administrative presence, protection of civilians and the ability of security forces to hold recaptured territory.
A United Nations report published in 2026 describes sustained activity by the JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel, particularly in the Tessit and Ménaka areas of Mali, as well as in parts of Niger and Burkina Faso. It also notes clashes between these organisations over territorial control.
This reality undermines narratives that frame security difficulties as the exclusive product of outside manoeuvres. Regional and cross-border factors are real, but they do not exempt any government from accounting for its own results.
The political dimension: insecurity and staying in power
Managing the terrorist threat also raises a broader political question: how can the region avoid a situation where persistent insecurity becomes a permanent argument for concentrating power and delaying a return to normal constitutional order?
It would be reckless to assert, without evidence, that AES leaders knowingly host or sustain terrorist groups in order to remain in power. Such an accusation requires concrete, independent and verifiable elements.
It is, however, legitimate to examine the political consequences of a situation in which the security threat remains omnipresent while military authorities continue to present counterterrorism as a major justification for their rule.
The distinction matters: denouncing the possible political exploitation of insecurity is not the same as claiming that leaders themselves organise that insecurity. The first is political analysis; the second demands proof.
What people want is results, not explanations
In Tessit, the opposing claims by the JNIM and the Islamic State do not yet allow a definitive determination of which group prevailed on 9 October. But that uncertainty does not change the main issue: these organisations remain capable of conducting operations and contesting control of certain areas.
For residents, the consequences are tangible. Insecurity disrupts travel, hampers economic activity and complicates access to essential services. Talk of sovereignty, international alliances and external enemies cannot indefinitely substitute for measurable results on the ground.
The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger therefore face a simple demand: prove their ability to protect populations, prevent armed groups from establishing a lasting presence and restore an effective public presence in affected areas.
Sovereignty is not measured only by the partners a state chooses or the foreign forces it expels. It is also measured by a state’s capacity to protect its citizens on its own territory.
As long as armed groups continue to fight over territory in the Sahel, AES authorities will have to answer one question: beyond rhetoric and accusations aimed abroad, what durable results can they show to guarantee the security of their people?
By Jeanne Ntouba — Journaliste / Rédacteur
