The accusation leveled at the Partido Popular (PP) by Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares is unprecedented in the realm of Spanish foreign policy. In recent weeks, he has branded the opposition party as ‘anti-Moroccan’, escalating tensions far beyond the usual political sparring between government and opposition.
According to Albares, the PP has transformed Spain’s external relations—particularly with Morocco—into a tool for domestic political confrontation. The rift deepened after controversial statements from current and former PP officials, prompting the foreign minister to declare that the opposition has become ‘an obstacle’ to Spain’s foreign policy objectives.
Beneath the political maneuvering lies a deeper reality. Since 2022, Spain and Morocco have cultivated a strategic partnership spanning migration control, economic ties, trade, security cooperation, and even co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup with Portugal. By December 2025, the two nations solidified this alliance with fourteen new cooperation agreements and a joint declaration to deepen political dialogue.
Now, as the PP vies for control of Spain, the question looms: what would happen to this carefully constructed relationship if Alberto Núñez Feijóo takes the helm?
The Sahara question: the PP’s unresolved dilemma
The status of Western Sahara remains the most contentious issue. In March 2022, Pedro Sánchez’s government endorsed Morocco’s autonomy plan as ‘the most serious, credible, and realistic basis’ for resolving the conflict—a move the PP swiftly condemned. Alberto Núñez Feijóo accused the administration of abandoning decades of bipartisan consensus without consulting the opposition.
Yet the PP’s own stance on the Sahara has shifted over time. Under Mariano Rajoy’s leadership, Spain maintained a cautious approach without outright opposition to Morocco’s proposal. Internal divisions within the PP have further muddied its position, with some members advocating for strong ties with Rabat while others aligned with pro-independence factions.
The contradictions reached a peak in July 2025, when a self-proclaimed representative of the Polisario Front attended the PP’s national congress, sparking outrage in Morocco and fueling doubts about the party’s future foreign policy under Feijóo.
By February 2026, the debate intensified when Albares accused the PP of ‘double-speak’, alleging that its leaders privately endorsed Morocco’s position on the Sahara while publicly denouncing it. If true, the implications for the PP are clear: criticizing the government’s stance from opposition benches is one thing, but reversing Spain’s official policy upon assuming power would carry significant diplomatic consequences.
A changed international landscape
The PP would not inherit the same geopolitical conditions that existed when Sánchez announced Spain’s shift in 2022. Morocco’s autonomy initiative has since gained broader international support, and the Sahara dispute has evolved within the United Nations framework. Spain, for its part, has woven its position into a much larger bilateral relationship with Morocco—one that cannot be easily undone.
Reversing this stance would do more than alter a diplomatic communiqué; it would reopen one of the most sensitive issues in Madrid-Rabat relations. The PP has yet to clarify its intentions: would a Feijóo government uphold Spain’s current position on the Sahara, or revert to the pre-2022 doctrine? So far, the party has avoided giving a definitive answer.
Vox’s influence and the rise of ‘national priority’
The Sahara is not the only flashpoint in the PP’s relationship with Morocco. Over recent months, the party has toughened its rhetoric on immigration and welfare access, partly in response to growing electoral competition with Vox.
In April 2026, the concept of ‘national priority’—historically tied to far-right movements in Europe and championed by Vox—entered the Spanish political debate. The idea, which prioritizes Spanish nationals over foreigners in accessing public benefits, forced the PP to take a stance after Vox pushed the issue in parliament and regional agreements.
Internal divisions surfaced within the PP, with some factions warning of the legal and political risks of adopting a stance long associated with the far right. Party officials attempted to reframe the debate, with some asserting that ‘all legal immigrants have the same rights as Spanish-born citizens’, while others proposed softer terms like ‘resident anchoring’ or ‘resident priority’.
Yet the damage was done. Vox had successfully pushed its agenda into the mainstream, leaving the PP to navigate the fallout. The episode underscored a harsh truth: the hardline party had reshaped the terms of political debate in Spain.
Feijóo’s dilemma: opposition rhetoric vs. governance reality
The PP’s central paradox lies in this disconnect. While in opposition, it can leverage Morocco and the Sahara to attack the government. But if it wins, it must manage one of Spain’s most critical and complex foreign relationships. These two roles are not always compatible.
Upon taking office, Feijóo would inherit a bilateral relationship transformed by shared interests in security, economics, and the 2030 World Cup. The most likely scenario is not a rupture with Morocco but a contradiction between the PP’s opposition rhetoric and its eventual governance.
The PP would likely find itself preserving the core of the current relationship with Rabat, forced to justify why it did not reverse decisions it had spent years denouncing. The accusation that the party sent ‘emissaries’ to Morocco to secretly endorse the autonomy plan only reinforces this point: beneath the public posturing, pragmatism may prevail.
The real question is not whether the PP is ‘anti-Moroccan’, as Albares claims. It is how far the party is willing to weaponize its relationship with Morocco for electoral gain—and how much of that rhetoric would survive the transition to power.
Spain’s ties with Morocco are too strategically vital to be reduced to political gamesmanship. Whether the government is led by the PSOE or the PP, the partnership with Rabat remains indispensable. The choice facing Feijóo, should he win, is stark: either align his government’s policies with his past criticism—risking instability with Morocco—or acknowledge the necessity of pragmatism, a stance the PP has not always embraced publicly.
This decision could become one of the first major foreign policy tests for a potential Feijóo administration.
