The relevance of formalizing religious practice?
In Senegal, religious belief transcends the private sphere, actively contributing to social cohesion, crisis mediation, education, and at times, political regulation. Despite this pervasive influence, the interactions between the State and religious communities largely operate through informal channels. This raises a crucial question: can the formalization of religious affairs help transcend clientelism without compromising the nation’s secular principles? Perhaps the debate is no longer about *whether* to institutionalize state-religion relations, but *how* to achieve this without institutionalizing religion itself.
First, we must dispel a common misconception: institutionalizing the relationship between the State and religious communities does not automatically imply making religion a state affair. Several African nations have already opted to establish public structures dedicated to religious matters.
Mali, for instance, operates a Ministry of Religious Affairs, Worship, and Customs, while Guinea has a General Secretariat for Religious Affairs. Côte d’Ivoire maintains a specific administration for religious worship. Morocco has taken this institutionalization much further through its Higher Council of Ulemas and the role of Amir Al-Mouminine.
Senegal, too, already possesses an nascent form of institutionalization. The establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Integration of Arabic Language Graduates in April 2024 marked a foundational step. Djim Dramé, its director, openly states that the Directorate’s core objective is to “formalize relations between the State and religions” and foster peace, harmony, and coexistence. Consequently, the contemporary discussion revolves less around the necessity of an administration for religious matters and more about the extent of institutionalization Senegal intends to adopt.
Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé, for example, views the proposed transformation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs into a General Delegation as a “positive evolution” and an “institutional elevation.” His perspective is particularly insightful: he posits that “religion is a resource in our country,” especially in promoting social cohesion and facilitating the adoption of public policies.
If religion already serves as a significant social, cultural, and even political asset for Senegal, why persist in managing its relationship with the State primarily through personal connections, courtesy visits, ad hoc delegations, and situational arrangements? It is within this context that Ousmane Sonko’s proposal should be understood.
He advocates for a genuine institutionalization of state-religious relations, structured around several key propositions: the creation of a dedicated budget for religious worship, the elevation of the Delegation for Religious Affairs to a Secretary of State or a full ministry, official recognition of specific accommodations granted to religious leaders, and the oversight of special funds by an accredited commission.
A collaborative secularism between politics and religion
The underlying rationale is unambiguous: to move beyond a system of discretionary favors towards a framework of clearly defined and universally known rights and regulations. When a religious leader obtains administrative ease due to proximity to the President, it constitutes a favor. However, if the same ease is formalized by legislation, with explicit conditions applicable to all leaders meeting identical criteria, this shifts into an institutional paradigm. Therefore, the State’s function should not be to control religious affairs, but to establish a structured framework for its interactions with them.
Senegal is constitutionally a secular state. This fundamental reality cannot be circumvented or diminished. Our Constitution asserts that the Republic is secular, democratic, and social, guaranteeing equality for all citizens regardless of religion and respecting all beliefs. Consequently, the institutionalization of religious worship cannot lead to any form of state religion.
However, the core inquiry is whether secularism prohibits the State from organizing its relations with religious bodies. Political science professor Maurice Soudieck Dione aptly demonstrates that Senegalese secularism possesses a unique historical trajectory, not precisely mirroring the strict separation model found in France. He describes it as a “collaborative secularism between politics and religion.” Thus, the distinctiveness of the Senegalese model lies in its operation through a “pragmatic accommodation” with various confraternities and the Church.
Nevertheless, the discussion cannot be oversimplified to: “since religion holds a significant societal position, a Ministry of Worship must be created.” Seydou Ka, a journalist and columnist for Le Soleil, rightly cautions against the potential risk of transforming secularism into a form of administrative control over religious affairs. He voices concerns about the “bureaucratization of the sacred” and a potential drift towards a “laicism” that could undermine the autonomy of religious leaders.
This observation is fundamental, as a clear distinction exists between institutionalizing relations *with* religions and institutionalizing religions *themselves*. In the former scenario, the State establishes an administrative interlocutor. In the latter, it gradually begins to define who is legitimate, who can speak on behalf of a community, which activities are permissible, how places of worship should operate, and which religious leaders qualify for public recognition.
The fear of ‘bureaucratizing the sacred’
For the State to attempt to organize religions directly presents an evident risk and could fundamentally alter their nature. Scholar Bakary Sambe has perfectly articulated the peril inherent in the political-religious dynamic in Senegal. He observes that “our leaders seek legitimacy in the religious sphere that they lack in the political one.” The danger of institutionalization, then, would be to transform an already clientelistic relationship into a bureaucratized form of clientelism. Instead of politicians occasionally seeking religious blessings, we might see the emergence of permanent mechanisms for distributing public resources.
It is precisely because these risks exist that I believe institutionalization is necessary. Presently, a significant portion of the relationship between the State and religious authorities is highly personalized. A president cultivates a unique bond with a specific khalife. A minister maintains close ties with a particular religious family. A local community might more easily secure certain investments due to its religious influence.
A major religious event receives special support because of its significance. The question then becomes: is it preferable to leave these practices informal, or to subject them to public regulations? In my view, it is better to institutionalize them. But with a crucial clarification: we must not institutionalize faith itself; we must institutionalize the State’s relationship with the phenomenon of religion.
This perspective aligns with Djim Dramé’s assertion that the Directorate of Religious Affairs aims to engage with “all religious sensitivities” and formalize State-religion interactions. The National Council of Laity has, moreover, expressed support for this approach, viewing the Directorate as a potentially effective interface between the Church and the State. Its president, Philippe Abraham Tine, however, stressed the importance of clearly explaining the structure’s role to prevent misunderstandings. This interfaith dimension is fundamental.
Senegal is a profoundly believing society, with Muslims constituting a vast majority, while Christian communities boast a significant historical and social presence. This socio-historical reality demands an institutional response. If the State supports citizens in education, health, culture, or sport, why should it treat religious life as a reality it can never institutionally acknowledge?
A public policy for religious affairs
The State can offer support for pilgrimages, contribute to the security of major religious events, back religious training, participate in the renovation of certain places of worship, or assist religious institutions, provided that the rules are transparent and equitable principles are consistently applied. Islamologist Abdoul Aziz Kébé specifically underscores the objective of supporting “Muslim, Christian, and traditional religious communities” in their worship and development. Fundamentally, Ousmane Sonko’s proposal initiates a debate far more significant than a mere administrative question.
It compels Senegal to critically examine its unique model of secularism. Seydou Ka reminds us of the risk of bureaucratizing the sacred. Étienne Smith encourages us to consider “proportional equidistance.” Seydi Diamil Niane emphasizes the necessity of institutionalizing relations between public authorities and religious leaders. Maurice Soudieck Dione highlights a particular collaboration between the political and religious spheres.
The experiences of Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Guinea, Niger, and Burkina Faso each demonstrate diverse approaches to organizing these relationships. Sonko, however, poses another question: why continue to manage through favor what could be organized by law? This is where the true value of his proposition lies. Provided, of course, that a fundamental error is avoided: institutionalizing worship must not equate to nationalizing religion. The State must remain secular. Religions must retain their autonomy. And citizens must be free to practice their faith without impediment.
Thus, I would not necessarily advocate for a “Ministry of Religion,” which could convey the impression that the State is managing spiritual affairs. Instead, I would champion a republican institution tasked with transparently and equitably organizing the relations between the State and religious practices. For Senegal cannot act as if religion does not exist.
The question, therefore, is no longer whether to institutionalize the religious fact, but how to do so without losing the unique character of Senegalese secularism. And in my opinion, the correct answer lies in one principle: do not institutionalize faith. Institutionalize the relations *with* faith. This is the only path that can reconcile republican secularism, religious freedom, confessional equity, and the autonomy of religious communities.
Khaly Sarr
