Following the coordinated assaults on April 25 and 26 that targeted Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously unspoken question has re-emerged in Malian security discussions: should negotiations commence with jihadist organizations? Confronted by the sheer scale of the offensive, jointly executed by the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Jnim), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Touareg rebels of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), a growing number of analysts and observers now contend that a solely military approach has reached its operational limits.
The offensive has rapidly expanded across Mali, from its northern reaches to the south, at an unprecedented pace. Armed groups have launched multiple synchronized attacks against security forces and symbols of state authority in at least six cities, even reaching the outskirts of Bamako. For the first time, the Jnim and the FLA have visibly operated in concert. The FLA, established in November 2024 after the dissolution of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast region in northern Mali.
These recent attacks have starkly exposed the Malian government’s vulnerabilities. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian partners from Africa Corps appear capable of halting the advance of these armed factions. Within regional media and diplomatic circles, the prospect of engaging in negotiations with Jnim is now being openly discussed with increasing frequency, set against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual strangulation and a deepening regional quagmire. Despite the rapidly deteriorating security landscape, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue. Bamako steadfastly rules out “any discussion with armed terrorist groups,” adhering to a strictly military response.
Nevertheless, pressure on the regime has consistently mounted since late April. Violence has intensified across the central part of the country. Just recently, several villages in the Bankass region, including Kouroude and Dougara, came under attack. According to local and security sources, the combined death toll from Wednesday’s and Friday’s assaults ranges between 70 and 80 fatalities.
an unprecedented alliance signals critical alarm
Jnim remains the primary driving force behind the jihadist surge across the Sahel, particularly in Mali, but also extending into Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas aligned under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the situation is becoming increasingly dire. These regimes, which seized power promising to restore security, are struggling to contain a threat that continues to expand. In Mali, for nearly a year, attacks have been drawing relentlessly closer to the capital.
“Beginning in July 2025, jihadists initiated attacks in western Mali, targeting gold mining and industrial sites. They subsequently focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively suffocating the capital,” notes Alain Antil, director of the Sub-Saharan Africa Centre at Ifri. Héni Nsaibia of Acled further analyzes: “This time, what is particularly striking is not merely the scale of the operation, but also the deliberate selection of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the very core of the regime.”
The demise of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati sent profound shockwaves through the government. Concurrently, the loss of Kidal – a territory reclaimed in late 2023 and heralded as a significant victory – represents a major strategic reversal.
the strategy of attrition
Even prior to this recent offensive, several experts had observed an evolution in Jnim’s strategic approach. “There’s a clear intent to establish a more dominant power dynamic, not only through security pressure but also to compel Malian authorities to engage in negotiations,” Alain Antil had previously explained.
The jihadist group is now aiming to replicate on a national scale tactics it previously tested locally: economic blockades, the gradual encirclement of urban centers, and sustained pressure on vital logistical routes. “Jnim is actively attempting to maintain an economic blockade around Bamako,” emphasizes the researcher.
According to Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this tactical shift is part of a long-term vision: “They have opted to weaken the government from within, prioritizing a strategy of entanglement and exploiting the existing fault lines within the military system.” He further adds: “Jnim no longer posits the strict application of Sharia law as a prerequisite for peace and now expresses openness to negotiation.”
Within this complex security landscape, the ongoing rivalry with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) introduces an additional layer of instability, as each group strives to expand its territorial control and influence.
a once-taboo option gains ground
Officially, Sahelian governments maintain a firm rejection of any dialogue. “For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not even considered. The rhetoric remains martial, with military action presented as the sole viable option,” observes Alain Antil.
However, the reality on the ground is far more intricate. Abuses perpetrated by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed by government forces and their Russian partners in Mali, a figure almost five times higher than those attributed to Jnim, according to GI-TOC data. This cycle of violence fuels grievances and inadvertently aids jihadist recruitment efforts.
States must resolve to a brave compromise.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel specialist researcher
Faced with this stalemate, an increasing number of experts advocate for a fundamental shift in approach. “The military option, when pursued in isolation, constitutes a dead end in confronting the jihadist phenomenon across the Sahel. It must be integrated with political negotiations,” asserts Alain Antil of Ifri. Certain grievances articulated by jihadist groups – such as corruption, demands for justice, and access to resources – could potentially serve as a foundation for discussions, without overlooking their violent methods.
Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa takes this perspective further: “States must commit to a brave compromise. The concept would involve integrating jihadists into the political framework to expose their limitations.” Yet, he establishes clear boundaries: “The principles of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable.”
As jihadist offensives continue to advance, the concept of negotiation is transitioning from a heresy to a plausible political consideration. For many experts in Mali, the pertinent question is no longer whether dialogue should occur, but rather for how long Bamako can realistically continue to resist it.
