Thousands of Moroccans reached the autonomous city of Ceuta by swimming just days after Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez’s visit to Algeria. This mirrors a 2021 incident when nearly 9,000 people entered the country following Spain’s decision to host the leader of the Polisario Front, a move that drew sharp criticism from Rabat.

The border between Ceuta and the Moroccan town of Fnideq descended into chaos as thousands—including families and individuals with mobility challenges—stormed into Spanish territory through hills or by swimming across the sea. While Moroccan police blocked roads, the sheer volume overwhelmed security forces.

Spanish authorities insist bilateral relations remain stable, highlighting an “excellent” cooperation agreement with Morocco and “intense” coordination to address the crisis. After initial silence, Moroccan officials confirmed the situation and agreed to repatriate those who entered illegally.

Legal ruling misinterpreted, experts argue

The Interior Ministry attributes the crisis to human trafficking networks allegedly exploiting a recent Supreme Court ruling. The decision guarantees legal assistance and individual assessment for all who enter Spanish territory. Ruth Ferrero, a political science professor at the Complutense Institute of International Studies (ICEI), clarifies this is not an “open door” policy. She emphasizes it simply upholds international asylum law and does not prevent returns or repatriations to Morocco.

Meanwhile, trafficking networks are believed to have capitalized on the ruling to facilitate illegal entries.

The 2021 precedent

This marks the second major incident in five years. In May 2021, nearly 9,000 people entered Ceuta in retaliation for Spain hosting Polisario leader Brahim Ghali for COVID-19 treatment—a move Morocco called “deplorable”. Reports later suggested Moroccan security forces had spread rumors among sub-Saharan migrants that border controls would be lifted that day.

Haizam Amirah Fernández, executive director of the Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies (CEARC), notes a pattern in these mass movements: “Moroccan authorities use human flows as a tool to send messages, often tied to unmet political expectations.” While Ferrero cautions against assuming all migration pressure is politically motivated, she acknowledges the role of misinformation and trafficking networks in fueling the crisis.

Police sources reported Moroccan authorities attempted to curb youth migration through public transport inspections and roadblocks. However, the sheer volume overwhelmed their efforts.

Diplomatic context: A visit to Algeria

The influx occurred a week after Sanchez’s visit to Algeria, described as “a new phase” in Spain-Algeria relations. The focus was on gas supply amid Middle East conflicts and the Strait of Hormuz blockade.

Amira Fernández suggests a possible link: “While I cannot confirm causality, the timing is striking.” He adds that Morocco views Spain’s improving ties with Algeria as a zero-sum game: “Any gain for Algeria is seen as a loss for Morocco, and vice versa.”

Ferrero argues Morocco has gained leverage over Spain not through deliberate strategy, but by exploiting Europe’s reliance on third countries for migration management. She underscores the need to address the role of social media in spreading misinformation that fuels migration attempts.

The Western Sahara conflict at the heart of tensions

This coercive migration tactic follows years of tensions between Spain and Morocco, particularly over Western Sahara. In December 2020, Rabat suspended high-level meetings with Madrid days after then-U.S. President Donald Trump recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel. Months later, Spain hosted Ghali, sparking a deadly border incident.

Amira Fernández describes the Spain-Morocco relationship as complex: “Morocco’s decision-making is centralized and assertive, often relying on force.” The conflict traces back to 1975 when Morocco invaded Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony. Madrid relinquished control, leaving 80% of the territory under Moroccan occupation and the remainder controlled by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.

The Trump administration’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in 2020 escalated tensions, culminating in the 2021 Ceuta crisis. A turning point came in 2022 when Sanchez wrote to Mohammed VI, supporting Morocco’s autonomy proposal for Western Sahara—a shift from Spain’s historic neutrality. “This letter marked Spain’s abandonment of neutrality,” says Amirah Fernández, “as it explicitly favored Morocco’s proposal, though not recognizing its sovereignty.”

The role of social media in the crisis

Beyond political motivations, social media played a key role in amplifying the crisis. A study by the North African Human Rights Observatory found that 81% of young people surveyed in Tangier, Tetouan, and Al Hoceima believed social media content portrayed irregular migration as a solution to improve living conditions.

The study, based on 500 respondents, revealed that 78.4% found it easy to locate posts promoting irregular migration, while 74.2% followed pages providing information or planning support for such journeys.